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Judicial examination of the criminal process in Canada generally,
and Nova Scotia in particular continues to grow. The consequent
explosion of technical law, which some would regard as an
implosion, places the academic writer on the horns of a dilemma
when faced with the task of reviewing recent developments in the
Nova Scotia criminal process. On the one hand, the writer may
compress and omit detail in order to cover adequately developments
in such widely disparate areas as murder and power to arrest. On the
other hand, coverage may be sacrificed to detailed discussion of the
law and its implications in a smaller number of selected areas. We
have chosen the latter course.
We do not, however, intend to imply that the topics discussed
hereunder were selected at random. We have chosen to focus on
three areas of recent development which in our view, will
significantly affect the future course of criminal law. They are the
struggle to develop a rational sentencing policy, the right to counsel
in breathalyzer cases, and ignorance of law as a mitigation, if not
outright defence, to certain offences. We join, of course, many
people in selecting sentencing law. It is a dynamic area of law
currently undergoing reexamination all across the country.
The problem of a suspect's right to counsel where that suspect has
been subject to a breath analysis demand has been the subject of
much recent litigation in Nova Scotia, as elsewhere. Indeed, an
appeal from Nova Scotia has recently resulted in a controversial
decision of the Supreme Court as will be seen shortly. Moreover,
this area is an example of the litigation explosion referred to above.
Prior to the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights a right to
counsel issue, in these circumstances, would not be litigated with
even a marginal expectation of success. Insofar as the Bill of Rights
opened new areas for the judicial examination of problems in the
criminal process, the growth of legal aid made it more financially
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possible for the average accused to litigate such issues. Whether one
approves or not, the results of this combination require exploration.
Finally, we have decided to deal with a case on the little litigated
area of ignorance of law as mitigating culpability. This is a complex
area of law which is certain to produce further litigation, if not
clarity, in the foreseeable future.
H. Sentencing Developments
1. Introduction
We have witnessed in recent times a veritable explosion of
litigation contesting sentencing principles and practices. ' This is not
surprising in the face of the continuing debate centering on the
fundamental premises, such as can be identified, 2 of the criminal
law itself.3 The sentencing question, as a microcosm of the criminal
law "system ' 4 is an unusually contentious part of our law. For it
combines, under a single legal issue, most of the great questions
that plague the criminal law. These include, among others, the
merits of the adversarial system as a method to achieve fairness, 5
the wisdom (in the face of non-legal expertise in the area) of
allowing the judiciary to decide social questions, 6 the elasticity of
evidentiary principles when applied to non-proof matters, 7 and,
1. Examples include Nova Scotia where, during the five year period of 1965-1969
there were only 23 reported decisions in the criminal law area and only 3 of those
dealt with sentencing. By contrast, volume 10 of the Nova Scotia Reports, second
series, which covers approximately a four month recent period reports 20 criminal
law decisions, 12 of them dealing with sentencing law.
2. See, for example, R. Silverman and J.Teevan, Jr., Crime in Canadian Society
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1975) at 21-44; H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal
Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968) at 1- 148; and J. Hall, General
Principles of Criminal Law (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947) at 1-65.
3. The clearest statement of a possible Canadian approach to this question has
come from the Law Reform Commission of Canada. See, for example, The
Principles of Sentencing and Dispositions (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) at
1-6.
4. See, for an example of the continuing effort to systematize law, A. Rapoport,
ed., Game Thoery as a Theory of Conflict Resolution (Boston: D. Reidel, 1974).
5. See, for example, C. Hanly, "Psychopathology of the Trial Process" in M.
Friedland, ed., Courts and Trials (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
6. See, for example, the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 212-215 and Report of Joint Committee of the
Senate and House of Commons on Capital Punishment (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1956) at 18-19.
7. See, for examples, A. Doob, "Psychology Evidence" in M. Friedland, ed.,
Courts and Trials, supra, note 5 and Parole in Canada, Report of the Standing
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ultimately, the utility of the criminal sanction itself.8
Nova Scotia courts, particularly the Appeal Division of the
Supreme Court, have in recent months faced the increased number
of sentencing cases that have arisen from the crystallization of these
issues in specific cases. This note attempts to examine those
decisions in the hope that a reasonable estimation of the current
Nova Scotia position in sentencing law can be presented. Spatial
limitations, of course, restrict the detaied part of this note to a
discussion of the most fundamental developments. These are
examined in the first part of the note, which is a more or less critical
view of the basic role and practice of the Appeal Division in
sentencing appeals involving indictable offences. Two offences,
armed robbery and manslaughter, are given particular attention. The
second part of the note will detail largely without critical comment
recent developments in certain peripheral areas of sentencing,
including the pre-sentence reports, the principles affecting consecu-
tive sentencing, the importance of deterrence, and the identification
of certain non-traditional factors that may properly be given weight
in the sentencing decision.
2. Sentencing Principles: Manslaughter and Armed Robbery Cases
Section 614 of the Criminal Code allows the Appeal Division,
when hearing an appeal as to a sentence in an indictable offence, 9 to
"consider the fitness of the sentence" and either "vary the
sentence" within the prescribed limits or "dismiss the appeal." 10
In interpreting its obligations under this section the Appeal Division
has developed three interrelated principles of law, each of which
will be examined here. The three principles deal with the
recognition of sentencing principles, the correct use of those
principles, and the degree of variance from either of these that is
required before the Court will intervene.
The last named principle,which will here be referred to as the
"intervention principle" has been best stated by Macdonald J. A. in
R. v. Cormier:"
Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1974) at 61-86.
8. See, for examples, H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, supra, note
2 and J. Hall, General Principles of the Criminal Law, supra, note 2.
9. The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 614.
10. Id.
11. R. v. Cormier (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 687 at 694-5; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 235 at 241
(S.C., A.D.).
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Thus it will be seen that this Court is required to consider the
'fitness of the sentence imposed', but this does not mean that a
sentence is to be deemed improper merely because the members
of this Court feel that they themselves would have imposed a
different one; apart from misdirection or non-direction on the
proper principles, a sentence should be varied only if the Court is
satisfied that it is clearly excessive or inadequate to the offence
proved or to the record of the accused...
The intervention principle, therefore, does not enjoy an independent
existence. It operates only in relation to at least one and in most
cases both of the other issues: the principles of sentencing and their
correct application. If error in either of these is sufficient to satisfy
the degree of error requirement, then the intervention principle's
application will result in a reversal of the lower court. If no error is
found in either the statement of principles or their application, or if
the error found is not of a sufficient degree then the intervention
principle requires the Court to affirm the lower court decision on
sentencing. The question becomes, therefore, what are the correct
principles of sentencing and what rules govern their application?
It is almost axiomatic for Nova Scotia lawyers to say that the
province's principles of sentencing are contained in the judgment of
the late McKinnon C.J.N.S. in R. v. Grady:12
It has been a practice of this Court to give primary consideration
to protection of the public, and then to consider whether this
primary objective could best be attained by (a) deterrence, or (b)
reformation and rehabilitation of the offender, or (c) both
deterrence and rehabilitation.
Despite the widespread reference to these principles in Nova
Scotia 13 they should be read in conjunction with three other cases.
In Cormier'4 Macdonald J.A. speaking for the Court, found that the
principles contained in Grady do not conflict with the sentencing
principles of the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections
(the Ouimet Report),15 and that the two of them should "henceforth
go hand in hand." 16 The principles referred to by the Court are:
12. R. v. Grady (1971), 5 N.S.R. (2d) 264 at 266 (S.C., A.D.).
13. P. 0 Hearn, "Nova Scotia's Principles of Sentencing and Types of Sentences
Available" in J. Ortego, ed., Sentencing Alternatives and Methods -Dalhousie
Continuing Legal Education Series, No. 10. (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1975)
at 5.
14. R. v. Cormier (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 687; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 235 (S.C., A.D.).
15. Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, supra, note 6.
16. R. v. Cormier (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 687 at 698; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 235 at 244
(S.C., A.D.).
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The overall views of the Committee may be summed up as
follows: segregate the dangerous, deter and restrain the rationally
motivated professional criminal, deal as constructively as
possible with every offender as the circumstances of the case
permit, release the harmless, imprison the casual offender not
committed to a criminal career only where no other disposition is
appropriate. In every disposition the possibility of rehabilitation
should be taken into account. 17
The exact meaning to be attributed to the expression "go hand in
hand" is unclear. In R v. Osachie, 18 a case preceding Cormier, the
Court had referred to the Ouimet Report principles without actually
adopting them. Then in R. v. Huskins, 19 a case decided after
Cormier, the Court indicated that Ouimet Report's principles should
be "borne in mind" 20 by a sentencing Court. These were cases in
which the application of both the Grady principles and the Ouimet
Commission principles suffered no obvious friction. Given that this
may not always be the case it is probably correct to assume that in
Nova Scotia the broadly stated principles of the Ouimet
Commission Report may be considered so long as their application
does no damage to the integrity of the Grady principles. All of this
should be read against the obvious fact, and one which has been
recognized by the Appeal Division, that it is in the nature of
sentencing principles that they retain sufficient elasticity to, when
appropriate, change with the times. 21
If the Appeal Division finds, in reviewing the sentencing
principles of the lower court, that there was sufficient error in the
statement of principles to amount to misdirection or non-direction,
as those terms are used in the intervention principle, then the Appeal
Division may intervene and vary the sentence. If, however, the
Appeal Division is satisfied that the correct principles were applied,
then it is obliged to consider that the principles were correctly
applied in the particular circumstances of the case before it. Grady
22
also contains the best statement of the Court's practice in this
regard:
It would be a grave mistake, it appears to me, to follow rigid
rules for determining the type and length of sentence in order to
17. Report, supra, note 15.
18. R. v. Osachie (1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 524; 24 C.R.N.S. 285 (S.C., A.D.).
19. R. v. Huskins (1974), 10N.S.R. (2d) 553 (S.C., A.D.).
20. Id. at 558.
21. R. v. Stuart (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 591; 24 C.C.C. (2d) 370(S.C., A.D.).
22. R. v. Grady (1971), 5 N.S.R. (2d) 264 at 266-267 (S.C., A.D.).
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secure a measure of uniformity, for almost invariably different
circumstances are present in the case of each offender. There is
not only the offence committed but the method and manner of
committing; the presence or absence of remorse, the age and
circumstances of the offender, and many other related factors.
For these reasons it may appear at times that lesser sentences are
given for more serious offences and vice versa, but the court must
consider each individual case on its own merits, even if the
different factors involved are not apparent to those who know
only of the offence charged and the penalty imposed.
Variance in sentencing is, therefore, an expected and defensible
result. Using the intervention principle again the Court will
intervene only if the sentence given below is "clearly excessive or
inadequate to the offence proved or the record of the accused." 
23
There is obviously a very delicate balance that must be struck
here. The danger of requiring at the same time the utilization of
uniform sentencing principles is that the courts will use what
Macdonald J.A. has called the "cookie cutter" 24 approach with the
unfortunate result that individualized sentencing will be sacrificed at
the expense of uniformity. At the other end of the spectrum is the
potential that individualized sentencing will result in such a
diversity of sentences that some defendants will appear to have been
unduly favoured and lower courts will be unable to locate the
elusive thread of logic binding the decisions together, thus
precipitating confusion and possibly chaos.
Two lines of cases, one dealing with armed robbery, and the
other dealing with manslaughter, illustrate the Court's attempt to
maintain the balance between, on one hand, the unacceptable
alternative of completely uniform sentences and, on the other hand,
the equally unacceptable alternative of indefensible diversities in
sentencing. The remainder of this portion of the note will be
devoted to a study of two lines of cases that illustrate this problem as
well as the Appeal Division's application of the intervention
principle in the light of the principles of sentencing. In the first
series of cases, all dealing with armed robbery, the Court has moved
toward a striking uniformity in sentencing, while in the other line of
cases dealing with manslaughter, it has achieved remarkable
diversity. It should be remarked at the outset that each carries the
potential punishment of life imprisonment. 
25
23. R. v. Cormier (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 687; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 235 (S.C., A.D.).
24. R. v. Smith (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 289 at 300 (S.C., A.D.).
25. The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 219, 303.
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In Huskins, 26 the defendant had forced a man at gunpoint to hand
over a payroll of over $2,600 as it was being carried from a bank to
a store. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years and made it
concurrent with a separate three year penalty for theft. The Appeal
Division, in a decision delivered by Macdonald J.A., affirmed the
length of the sentence but made it consecutive with the other
sentence. In the course of the opinion, he said:
• . . [I]am conscious of the fact that parliament has considered
armed robbery to be so grave and serious an offence that it has
prescribed that anyone found guilty thereof is liable to
imprisonment for life. The general public must be protected from
those who steal from them at gun point.
And later on the same page he added:
In cases of this kind, however, the Courts must not overlook or
downplay the element of deterrence. The sentence in the present
case must be of sufficient severity to hopefully deter the appellant
from repeating such act and to also deter those who might be
tempted to tread the same criminal path. On the other hand, the
sentence should not be of such severity that by its very harshness
it defeats the purpose of a custodial sentence. There must always
be room in the sentencing process for the tempering of justice
with mercy.
27
In R. v. Bratsensis28 the Court increased the sentence of
imprisonment from ninety days to three years in another armed
robbery case. The defendant presented the Court with qualities that
would be consistent with the minimum appropriate sentence. He
was twenty-five years of age, married with two children, employed
in the U.S. in business with his father, apparently of good character,
and clear of any criminal record except for a minor offence in the
U.S. some time earlier.
These two cases came to bear in R. v. Brennan and Jensen29 in
which the Appeal Division increased the two defendants' sentences
of imprisonment from twenty-four months and eight months
(followed by sixteen months probation) respectively to three years
imprisonment for each of them. Mac Keigan C.J.N.S., speaking for
the Court, said:
[ . . T]he courts have only in the most exceptional circumstances
refrained from imposing a sentence of at least three years'
26. R. v. Huskins (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 553 (S.C., A.D.).
27. Id. at 558.
28. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 298 (S.C., A.D.).
29. (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 84; 23 C.C.C. (2d) 403 (S.C., A.D.).
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imprisonment for armed robbery even where it is a first offence
by a person of previously good character. 2aa
The Court has not yet faced the "exceptional circumstances" that
would justify a term of less than three years imprisonment for armed
robbery. In R. v. Jarrett30 the Court made it clear that this sentence
was not appropriate in the case of a forty-eight year old man with a
lengthy criminal record. The lower court, relying on Brennan and
Jensen3a , had sentenced the defendant to three years imprisonment
(with credit for time served) and the Appeal Division increased the
sentence to eight years imprisonment, finding that the three years
sentence, which should be thought of as a minimum sentence for
armed robbery, was not appropriate for this defendant because it
failed to sufficiently emphasize deterrence.
In R. v. Smith 32 the 17 year old defendant, who had a record of
several convictions for Criminal Code violations, had been
sentenced to five years imprisonment upon conviction for armed
robbery. The Appeal Division in a decision delivered by Macdonald
J.A., lowered the sentence to three years imprisonment, finding that
the defendant was entitled to the customary minimum sentence,
largely because of his age.
While the armed robbery cases have been moving toward a
uniformity in sentencing, manslaughter decisions have gone exactly
the other way. In three recent decisions the defendants received, in
the final result, sentences of ten years imprisonment, five years
imprisonment, and, most surprisingly, in one case sentence was
suspended for two years and defendant placed on probation. It goes
without saying, of course, that variations in sentence are necessary
in any rational scheme of sentencing. But here the variations are so
great that they tax, if not embarrass, the intellect. This becomes
especially true when they are read against the Court's minimum
sentence principle for armed robbery and the similarity in the facts
of the three cases.
Nor can it be discounted that the defendant who received the least
punitive sentence; who suffered less penalty for killing a spouse
than nearly all others suffer for theft of money (without harm to the
victim); and who escaped the net of the general deterrence doctrine
29 a. Id. at 88; 23 C.C.C. at 407.
30. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 270 (S.C., A.D.).
31. R. v. Brennan and Jensen (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 84; 23 C.C.C. (2d) 403
(S.C., A.D.).
32. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 289 (S.C., A.D.).
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(which will be examined later) is a woman, while her less fortunate
compatriots are men.
The three cases involved are R. v. Cormier, 33 R. v. Renton, 
34
and R. v. Wilson 35. In Cormier the defendant attended with her
husband and three friends at a tavern on August 2, 1973. After a
time at the tavern the group left there and congregated at
defendant's home where, except for the defendant, they continued
drinking. Eventually all of them left except for the deceased and a
male friend. They were asked several times by telephone to join one
of the departed guests, a next door neighbour, at her apartment.
Finally, at about 2 a.m. in the morning they accepted the invitation.
Mrs. Cormier followed her husband and his friend over to the
apartment some minutes later. Apparently she brought the murder
weapon, a knife, along with her. She was suspicious of her
husband's relationship with the next door neighbour. When Mrs.
Cormier arrived at the apartment she found the deceased sitting with
the neighbour on a couch. A verbal struggle ensued in which the
deceased apparently threatened Mrs. Cormier with physical assault,
a threat he apparently had made and carried out in the past, and Mrs.
Cormier apparently threatened her husband with the knife.
Eventually they left the apartment and went home. Apparently the
deceased attempted to kick Mrs. Cormier while on the way home.
Some minutes later Mrs. Cormier emerged from her home, saying to
a friend, "George, help me. I believe I killed him." By one stab of
the knife the deceased's life had ended.
In sentencing the defendant for manslaughter, the trial judge
referred to the sentencing principles and said, among other things:
"Protection of the public is a primary concern which I keep in
mind. ' 36 The Court was satisfied, as was the trial court in each of
these manslaughter cases, that the defendant would not again
commit the offence. With respect to general deterrence the trial
judge said:
There is the factor of deterrence of others; it is important that
other people not get the idea that this is a light matter, that the
taking of life is something which society has no interest in, and
that the law and the judges don't regard it as serious.3 7
33. R. v. Cormier (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 687; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 235 (S.C., A.D.).
34. R. v. Renton (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 60 (S.C., A.D.).
35. R. v. Wilson (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 629; 14 C.C.C. (2d) 258 (S.C., A.D.).
36. R. v. Cormier (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 687 at 690; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 235 at 238
(S.C., A.D.).
37. Id. at 691; 22 C.C.C. at 239.
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Up to this point, of course, the judge was squarely within the
Grady38 rules. But he went on to say:
The one factor that I have kept in mind and have been concerned
with since the jury brought in the verdict is the effect on your
family. 39
He emphasized the importance of this factor again later on in the
sentencing remarks:
So I will suspend the passing of sentence for a two year period
and grant a probation order. And I do hope that you realize that I
am doing this partly out of consideration of your children. 4o
The Appeal Division, in considering the Crown's appeal of the
sentence, upheld the lower court. The Crown argued that the trial
court enunciated the correct principles of sentencing, but did not
follow them. It argued that the lower court gave primary
consideration to the defendant's family, not protection of the public.
The Appeal Division "after reading and re-reading" the trial
judge's remarks in their entirety, found that, indeed, the protection
of the public was referred to as the overriding factor and the trial
judge "did consider this factor in imposing the sentence."41
Having disposed of the principles problem the Court turned its
attention to the second factor in the intervention principle, the
adequacy of the sentence. The Court, through Macdonald J.A.,
found that s. 614, as interpreted by the Court, permits the Court to
intervene in such cases only if the sentence is "clearly excessive or
inadequate in relation to the offence proven or to the record of the
accused." Later, after reference to an Ontario Court of Appeal
decision, this standard changed slightly so that Macdonald J.A. was
left with the following question: "Can it be said that the sentence in
the present case is so manifestly inadequate as to be clearly
erroneous?",42 He answered the question in the negative, referring
to several factors. The first was the traditional first instance
doctrine: the trial judge was closer to the scene, personally observed
the defendants, and his opinion should not be easily tampered with.
The second was that, even though the prior history of such cases
was that they "almost invariably involve a form of imprisonment,"
there was precedent for the "rare case where there are exceptional
38. Id. at 691-692; 22 C.C.C. at 239-240.
39. Id. at 691; 22 C.C.C. at 239.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 694; 22 C.C.C. at 241.
42. Id. at 696; 22 C.C.C. at 242.
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and mitigating circumstances justifying the suspension of sentence
for manslaughter," citing two unreported decisions. Finally, the
Court agreed that the trial judge emphasized consideration for the
defendant's family, but the Court could not find, after considering
all things, that "he ignored or failed to apply proper principles in
favour solely of the respondent and her family." 43 The decision
ended with a traditional refrain that often accompanies decisions
which stretch the limits of predictability: the Grady rules are intact;
the decision is limited to the "manifestly inadequate" rule; there is
no presumption of leniency in future cases; and the Ouimet
Commission rules should "go hand-in-hand" with Grady in
future. 44
Cormier was followed by Renton45. Mr. Renton had, like Mrs.
Cormier, killed his spouse during a drunken quarrel, except that the
evidence was more substantial in his case that he was, or had
recently been, drinking at the time of the offence. He, too,
suspected his spouse of extramarital misconduct, except that in his
case the grounds of his suspicion were open and obvious. In fact,
just prior to her death, his wife taunted his sexual ability by
comparing him with the other man, with the clear inference that the
other man was a better man. He, too, killed his spouse by a single
stab wound, and felt deeply remorseful afterwards. He tried
artificial resuscitation to bring her back to life, ran for help, and was
kneeling beside her talking to her in a low voice when the police
arrived. He, like Mrs. Cormier, had no criminal record, and there
was no suggestion that he was likely to commit the offence again.
He did not fit the description Chief Justice MacKeigan was later to
give of Mrs. Cormier as a "poor mother of seven children" who
killed "in the middle of a drunken row with an abusive husband".
4 6
He was, however, a 49 year old electrician, a veteran of the Royal
Air Force, a veteran of the Second World War, and a father of three
grown children. The jury sent him to the sentencing question with
another thing in his favour which Mrs. Cormier did not have: a
recommendation for mercy. On January 6, 1975, the Appeal
Division (Macdonald J.A. dissenting) affirmed a sentence of ten
years imprisonment for Mr. Renton.
47
43. Id. at 697; 22 C.C.C. at 243.
44. Id. at 697-698; 22 C.C.C. at 243-244.
45. R. v. Renton (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 60 (S.C., A.D.).
46. R. v. Morrison (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 98 at 102 (S.C., A.D.).
47. R. v. Renton (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 60 (S.C., A.D.).
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The trial judge had, despite Grady, identified four principles to
be applied in sentencing: deterrence, reformation, retribution, and
mercy. In speaking of the jury's recommendation for clemency, he
said:
• . .there is the fact that a jury of his peers, 12 common-sensed
men have in their good judgment recommended to me that I
exercise clemency in this case. I am not going to overlook what
the jury has said and what you have said.
4 8
Coffin J.A., speaking for himself and Cooper J.A., found that the
trial judge did not act on any wrong principle:
As I have already indicated, the trial judge dealt specifically with
principles of deterrence, reformation, retribution and mercy. I
cannot find that in his discussion of these principles, he has done
violence to the primary objective of protection of the public as
enunciated by Grady, and the gaining of that objective by
deterrence, reformation, and rehabilitation or both deterrence and
rehabilitation. 
4 9
Macdonald J.A., in dissent, found that the trial judge had placed
an "undue emphasis on deterrence." 50 Interestingly, Coffin J. A.
said at one point in his judgment:
In my view what the trial judge finally had in mind after
addressing himself to all the elements which I have mentioned
and to the arguments of counsel was the element of deterrence of
others. 51
Macdonald J.A. would have reduced the sentence to five years
imprisonment and suggested that the emotional element, which so
often surfaces in domestic deaths, ought to be a mitigating factor in
such cases. 
5 2
Wilson 53 completes the trilogy of the manslaughter cases
illustrating the second problem of applying sentencing principles,
the problem of wide diversity in sentencing. It was decided after
Cormier but before Renton. Mr. Wilson was a 50 year old fireman
with no criminal record except for two impaired driving violations.
He was the father of seven children; five by a previous marriage and
two by his common law marriage to the deceased. He apparently
killed his wife by beating her to death during a struggle in which he
48. Id. at 67.
49. Id. at 74.
50. Id. at 80.
51. Id. at 67.
52. Id. at 79-80.
53. R. v. Wilson (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 629 (S.C., A.D.).
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had been attempting to persuade her to return to the matrimonial
domicile. He had returned from work the evening before her death
to find that neither she nor either of their two children was at home.
He proceeded to pick up the four year old child from the day nursery
and to look for the deceased and the two year old child. He was
unsuccessful that evening and continued his search the following
morning until he found her and the child in an apartment in the
company of several people. He apparently told his wife to return
home, partly because he felt the environment in the apartment was
not proper for the young child. When she refused to do so, he
physically forced her to accompany him home. There was evidence
that he was particularly forceful in his physical handling of her on
the way back to their apartment and that she steadfastly resisted his
verbal requests to return home. The medical examiner later found
the main cause of death to be hemorrhage from a liver laceration,
which probably resulted from the beating. 54
Mr. Wilson pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to
ten years imprisonment. The Appeal Division, through Macdonald
J.A., with Coffin J.A. dissenting, reduced the sentence to five years
imprisonment. The trial judge had referred to four principles to be
considered: deterrence, reformation or rehabilitation, retribution,
and mercy. In speaking of retribution the trial court had said:
.. . not for one moment is there the matter of retribution
uppermost in my mind, at least not that type of retribution that
speaks of an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth. No, no, by no
means. Rather, it is that society, the community at large, is
anxious to express its repudiation of the crime committed, to
establish and to assert the welfare of the community against any
evil in its midst. Thus it seems to me that the infliction of
punishment becomes a source of security to all and is elevated to
a very important place when it is regarded not as an act or wrath
or vengence, [sic] but rather as an indispensable sacrifice to the
common safety. 
55
It is worth noting that the same language, almost verbatim appeared
in the lower court judgment in Renton. Later, the Wilson lower
court judge said:
What becomes uppermost then today, what becomes uppermost
today is that the deterrence, the deterrence that the Court must
keep in mind, in its awesome responsibility in matters of this kind
54. Id. at 644.
55. Id. at 645.
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. . . awesome. . . a life has been taken. A life has been taken. 56
Macdonald J.A., speaking for himself and the Chief Justice,
found that the use of the terms "retribution" and "punishment"
were unnecessary and that:
A sentence adequate to deter others will be one which, quite apart
from any other facts taken into account, will express society's
repudiation of the crime committed and which, by deterring
others, will promote the common safety. 
57
In the final analysis he found that the learned trial judge "had
overemphasized the element of deterrence to others and under-
valued the fact that in his opinion the appellant would not again
commit an offence." 
58
Coffin J.A. dissented, specifically because he could not agree
that the judge's use of the words "retribution" and "punishment"
were fatal, noting that the trial judge in Grady had used the term
"retribution" and that the late McKinnon C.J.N.S., despite the
precise language of the Grady rules, found that the lower court had
not proceeded "on any wrong principle." 59
These three manslaughter sentencing decisions provide a
shocking example to the non-lawyer of the vagaries of the legal
method. Each defendant was convicted of manslaughter, each killed
in a moment of passion, each brought a reasonably good
background to the court, and each one's sentence was found to be
consistent with the Grady principles. It should be emphasized that
the point being made here is not that Mrs. Cormier was dealt with
unfairly for indeed the final result in her case was probably correct.
There is, to be sure, an air of incongruity about a case which speaks
of "protection of the public" and releases the defendant back into
the community and another that speaks of "mercy" and sends a
similarly situated defendant to a federal penitentiary for ten years.
But Mrs. Cormier's children were still young and there was no
evidence that she had, except for this aberration, been anything
other than a good parent. One wonders, however, why the Appeal
Division, in considering Mr. Wilson, whose disagreement with his
wife arose because he believed she was mishandling their infant
children, did not address itself to the separation their sentence was
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 646.
59. Id. at 647.
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causing between a father and his seven children. Finally, one is
forced to ask: would the sentence in Cormier and Renton had been
the same if these men had been the victims rather than the
defendants?
3. Other Developments in Sentencing
(a). The Pre-Sentence Report
The pre-sentence report is being used with increasing frequency
in Nova Scotia. 60 So are reports from individuals who do not enjoy
official status as probation officers, but who are otherwise
influencing the court's judgment. In R. v. Cormier, for example, an
organization (Unison) assisted the court on the sentencing question
by informing the court that it had located suitable living
arrangements for Mrs. Cormier and her children.
61 In R. v. Craig, 62
both the trial court and the Appeal Division were clearly influenced
in the sentencing decision by testimony from Mr. Martin Dolan, a
man in charge of a rehabilitation project, about the rehabilitation
potential of the defendant. Neither pre-sentence report nor
testimony from other interested persons should be relied upon by the
sentencing judge if they relate to the facts of the case. The Appeal
Division made this clear in R. v. Rudyk:
I would here urge that a presentence be confined to its very
necessary and salutary role of portraying the background,
character and circumstances of the person convicted. It should
not, however, contain the investigator's impressions of the facts
relating to the offence charged, whether based on information
received from the accused, the police, or other witnesses, and
whether favourable or unfavourable to the accused. And if the
report contains such information the trial judge should disregard
it in considering sentence. 
6 3
This principle was applied to testimony from other interested
persons in Craig. 64
(b). Consecutive Sentences
In R. v. Reddick6 5 Macdonald J.A. disagreed sharply with the
60. G. Hayes, "Adult Probation Services" in J. Ortego, ed., Sentencing
Alternatives and Methods - Dalhousie Continuing Legal Education Series, No.
10, supra, note 13 at 39-44.
61. R. v. Cormier (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 687 at 692 (S.C., A.D.).
62. R. v. Craig (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 695 (S.C., A.D.).
63. R. v. Rudyk (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 541 at 544-545 (S.C., A.D.).
64. R. v. Craig (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 695 (S.C., A.D.).
65. R. v. Reddick (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 425 (S.C., A.D.).
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Chief Justice and Cooper J.A. over the meaning of the terms in s.
645(a) of the Code. Section 645 is the general, although not the
only, 66section of the Code permitting consecutive sentences and s.
645(a) speaks of consecutive sentencing being available for a
defendant who "is convicted while under sentence for an
offence." 67 In Reddick the defendant was convicted of three
separate offences at three separate trials on three separate dates.
Sentencing for all three offences, however, took place on only one
day at only one court session. Macdonald J.A. argued, therefore,
that s. 645(a) was not available because, with respect to the two
other offences, no sentence had been pronounced at the time of
conviction. Nor did s. 645(c) apply because it dealt only with
multiple convictions at one sitting of a court. The Chief Justice
disagreed and argued that, in any case, s. 645 could not be so
construed as to restrict the Court of Appeal's power under s. 614 to
vary a sentence "within the limits prescribed by law." 68 In R. v.
Muise (No. 3)69 Macdonald J.A. agreed with the Chief Justice as a
matter of precedent from Reddick, but referred to his statements in
Reddick.
The more common problem is, of course, to determine the
situations in which it is appropriate to make sentences consecutive
when the defendant has, at one sitting, been convicted on multiple
charges. The Appeal Divison has moved in the same direction as
other courts have by adopting the general rule that consecutive
sentences are appropriate if the offences cannot be said to have
arisen out of one continuous criminal act, but that, in any case, the
totality of sentences imposed should be appropriate to all the
circumstances. 7
0
(c). Things That Can Be Considered in Sentencing
In R. v. DeCoste71 the defendant, a nineteen year old male, had
been sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment for an indecent
66. The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 137.
67. Id., s. 645 (a).
68. R. v. Reddick (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 425 at 426 (S.C., A.D.).
69. R. v. Muise (No. 3) (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 216; 23 C.C.C. (2d) 440 (S.C.,
A.D.).
70. See, for example,R. v. Veinot(1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 116(S.C., A.D.);R. v.
Phillips (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 121 (S.C., A.D.);R. v. Huskins (1974), 10 N.S.R.
(2d) 553 (S.C., A.D.);R. v. Reddick (1974), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (S.C., A.D.).
71. R. v. DeCoste (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 94 (S.C., A.D.).
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assault that consisted entirely of grabbing two girls by the breasts
and releasing his grip when they began to protest. A pre-sentence
report concluded that the "community would be best served by his
receiving immediate and continuing psychiatric care." The
defendant's psychiatric condition clearly influenced the Appeal
Division to vary sentence to three months imprisonment with
immediate psychiatric treatment, to be followed by a two year
probationary period during which the defendant would be required
to receive psychiatric care under the terms of the probation order.
The psychological state of the defendant, as deduced from expert
testimony, was also a mitigating factor in R. v. Caldwel172 in which
the defendant, a twenty two year old father, was convicted of the
brutal rape of a ten year old girl. The sentence was accompanied
with a recommendation for psychiatric treatment. And in R. v.
Dobson73 the defendant was ordered, subject to approval by Adult
Probation Services, to continue psychiatric treatment.
In R. v. McGlone74 the defendant was charged with theft of
property valued at less than $200 from a taxi driver. The taxi driver
testified that his money changer, containing $6.48, was somehow
emptied during a trip in which the defendant and another man were
passengers. One of the items approved by the Appeal Division as a
factor in approving a sentence of six months imprisonment for the
defendant was "the need to protect taxi drivers who are especially
vulnerable to offences such as this." In R. v. Rose 75 the Appeal
Division affirmed a sentence in which the sentencing judge had
considered as a factor in the sentence "recent incidents of similar
violence in the particular area." The charge in that case was assualt
(by use of a knife) causing bodily harm and the defendant inflicted
several knife wounds on the victim.
In R. v. Evans76 the Appeal Division, through Macdonald J.A.,
with Cooper J.A. dissenting, ruled that if the operation of the
Parole Act was to the effect that a defendant could, in effect, be
twice punished for the single conviction before the Court then the
Court may consider the effect of the Parole Act as a mitigating
factor in favour of the defendant. In that case the defendant stood to
serve an additional 433 days because of a parole forfeiture and the
72. R. v. Caldwell (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 187 (S.C., A.D.).
73. R. v. Dobson (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 81 (S.C., A.D.).
74. R. v. McGlone (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 247 (S.C., A.D.).
75. R. v. Rose (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 432 (S.C., A.D.).
76. R. v. Evans (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 91; 24 C.C.C. (2d) 300 (S.C., A.D.).
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Appeal Division reduced the trial court's sentence by three months,
due in part to the operation of the Parole Act. Evans was followed
on this point in R. v. Jackson, 77 but it did not result in a reduced
sentence because, among other reasons, the trial judge had
considered Evans.
(d). Deterrence
The concept of deterrence is the most frequently given reason for
use of the intervention principle by the Appeal Division. It may be
of two types. Particular deterrence refers to the defendant and
general deterrence to the larger community. The principle, of
course, is that a proper sentence takes into account whether or not
both will be deterred by virtue of the sentence from doing what the
defendant has just been convicted for doing. Reversible error occurs
here not from failing to use deterrence as a principle, but from
unduly or insufficiently emphasizing either particular or general
deterrence.
Typical of the cases in this area is R. v. Morrison78 in which the
defendant "had been induced, persuaded and, indeed, forced by the
constant pleas, importunities, unreasonable demands and naggings
of his wife, reinforced by feigned illnesses, to try to support her in a
fantastically extravagant way of life." The result of this was that
defendant, a practicing barrister, eventually pleaded guilty to three
charges of fraud and received a suspension of sentence for two
years. The Appeal Division, disdaining the defendant's attempted
analogy to R. v. Cormier and other cases, imposed two year
concurrent sentences on each count, arguing that the sentence
should "reflect a substantial element of deterrence to others." In
cases dealing with narcotics, 79 and driving offences80 , the Appeal
Division has intervened in favour of general deterrence and in each
case increased the sentence given the defendant.
In matters of particular deterrence the Appeal Division has in the
past more often reduced sentences than in cases in which the court's
decision was based on general deterrence principles. In R. v.
Smith, 8 ' for example, the Appeal Division varied a five year
sentence for armed robbery downward to the three year minimum
77. R. v. Jackson (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 154; 23 C.C.C. (2d) 147 (S.C., A.D.).
78. R. v. Morrison (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 98at 102 (S.C., A.D.).
79. See, for example, R. v. MacArthur (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 353 (S.C., A.D.).
80. See, for example, R. v. McPhee (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 429 (S.C., A.D.),
81. R. v. Smith (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 289 (S.C., A.D.).
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standard, despite the criminal record of the defendant. The Appeal
Division was particularly influenced by the youth of the defendant
and his potential for reform. A contrary result obtained, of course,
in R. v. Jarrett. 
8 2
Sometimes the Appeal Division will increase or reduce a sentence
because of the deterrence doctrine, but without specifying whether
the lower court error related to general or particular deterrence. R.
v. Criyanovich83 is an example of this approach. The defendant, a
nineteen year old male, had pleaded guilty to a charge of break and
enter and received a sentence of two years imprisonment. His
accomplice, a seventeen year old female, received a suspended
sentence. The Appeal Division varied his sentence to six months
imprisonment holding that "the trial judge unduly emphasized the
element of deterrence."
Part of the problem in this area is that the mere consideration of
deterrence, even if correctly done, is not necessarily reflected in the
sentence. In each of the manslaughter cases referred to earlier there
was no issue of particular deterrence because in each case the
sentencing court was satisfied that the defendant would not again
commit the same offence.
This entire question is further complicated by the kinship between
particular deterrence, reformation, and rehabilitation, all of which
are terms found in the Grady formula.
III. Breath Analysis Developments
1. Introduction
In Brownridge v. The Queen8 4 the Supreme Court of Canada
announced, in less than unequivocal terms, 85 that an accused who is
82. R. v. Janett (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 270 (S.C., A.D.).
83. R. v. Criyanovich (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 549 (S.C., A.D.). Other examples
include R. v. Scallion (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 538 (S.C., A.D.); R. v. Reddick
(1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 425 (S.C., A.D.);R. v. DeCoste (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 94
(S.C., A.D.); R. v. Johnson (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 551 (S.C., A.D.); R. v. Goo
Goo (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 96 (S.C., A.D.).
84. [1972] S.C.R. 926; 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1; 7 C.C.C. (2d) 417; 18 C.R.N.S. 308.
85. See the discussion of Brownridge in S. Enticknap, Comment (1973), 37 Sask.
L.R. 300-312; R. Tapper, Brownridge v. The Queen: Enigma of Anathema?
(1973), 5 Man. L.J. 464. In addition, 0 Hearn J. commented in R. v. Jones (1972),
9 C.C.C. (2d) 5 at 8; 20 C.R.N.S. 58 at 61 (N.S. Cty. Ct.):
After reading the reasons, [in Brownridge] I had the irresistible impression,
... of a bridge hand from which all trumps have vanished .... I have found
it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to pin down the dominant reasoning
behind the judgment.
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subject to a demand for a breath sample 86 has a right to retain and
instruct counsel without delay before the law requires compliance
with that demand. 87 Since Brownridge was decided, the courts of
each province have been faced with a plethora of litigation
attempting to define with exactness the scope and limits of the
Brownridge right. 88 Nova Scotia has been no exception, and this
comment will discuss some of the recent Nova Scotia decisions in
light of the development of this area of law across Canada.
2. The Right to Counsel and Substantive Aspects of the Bill of Rights
(a). Charge of Refusal, (s. 235): "Reasonable Excuse"
Because Brownridge itself concerned the effect upon a charge of
failing, without reasonable excuse, to provide a breath sample,8 9 of
a breach of the right to counsel provision in the Bill of Rights, 90 the
courts have had little difficulty in applying the Brownridge result to
similar cases. Hence, in a case where an accused is denied the right
to counsel, and refuses to give a breath sample as a result, the law is
86. Under The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 19 70, c. C-34, s. 235(1).
87. The stage at which an accused is entitled to demand a lawyer has not been the
subject of decision to the author's knowledge. The reported cases concern requests
by the accused once he has reached the station to take the test. Quaere whether
"without delay" may be construed to mean that an accused may refuse to go to the
station until he telephones his lawyer.
88. The cases used for the purposes of this note were: R. v. Jones, (1972), 9
C.C.C. (2d) 5; 20 C.R.N.S. 58 (N.S. Cty. Ct.); R. v. Morgan (1972), 9 C.C.C.
(2d) 502 (N.S. Cty. Ct.); R. v. Drouin (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 18 (P.E.I. S.C.); R.
v. Sexton (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 131 (P.E.I.S.C.); R. v. Levy (1973), 11 C.CC.
(2d) 521; 21 C.R.N.S. 292 (N.S. Pro. Mag. Ct.); R. v. Penner [1973] 6 W.W.R.
94; 39 D.L.R. (3d) 246; 12 C.C.C. (2d) 468; 22 C.R.N.S. 35 (Man. C.A.); R. v.
Top (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 390 (Alta. S.C., T.D.); R. v. Balkan, [1973] 6
W.W.R. 617; 13 C.C.C. (2d) 482; 25 C.R.N.S. 109 (Alta. S.C., A.D.); R. v.
Bond (1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 512; 14 C.C.C. (2d) 497; 24 C.R.N.S. 273 (S.C.,
A.D.); R. v. Maksimchuk, [1974] 2 W.W.R. 668; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 478; 15 C.C.C.
(2d) 208 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Doherty (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 172; 16 C.C.C. (2d)
494; 25 C.R.N.S. 289 (S.C., A.D.); R. v. Porteous, [1974] 4 W.W.R. 411 (Man.
Pro. Ct.); R. v. Peterson, [1974] 4 W.W.R. 144; 16 C.C.C. (2d) 531 (Alta. S.C.,
A.D.); R. v. Stasiuk (1974), 25 C.R.N.S. 309 (Sask. D.C.); R. v. Walkington,
[1974] 6 W.W.R. 117; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 553 (Sask. C.A.); Hogan v. The Queen,
[1975] 2 S.C.R. 574; 9 N.S.R. (2d) 145; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 65; 26 C.R.N.S. 207; R.
v. Doherty (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 (N.S. Cty. Ct.); R. v. Irwin, [1974] 5
W.W.R. 744; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 563; 28 C.R.N.S. 23 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Jumaga,
[1974] 5 W.W.R. 580; 19 C.C.C. (2d) 286 (Man. C.A.); R. v. MacDonald,
(1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 293; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 350 (S.C., A.D.); R. v. Anderson
(1974), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 301 (Sask. C.A.).
89. The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 235(2).
90. The Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. III, s.2(c) (ii).
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clear that breach of the Bill of Rights affords a defence to a charge of
refusal, 91 absent special circumstances, although it is not clear as to
why this is so. 9 2 Broadly speaking, the judgment of Ritchie J. in
Brownridge may be said to rest upon a holding that breach of the
Bill of Rights constitutes a "reasonable excuse" for refusal in the
terms of s. 235(2).93 Laskin J. did not so hold, 94 preferring to base
the acquittal of the accused upon the fact that the conviction was
vitiated by operation of the Bill of Rights itself, because breach of
the Bill of Rights was the foundation of the charge.
95
In R. v. Morgan the Nova Scotia Appeal Division explicitly
adopted the point of view espoused by Ritchie J.; 96 but in the
91. See, for example, R. v. Sexton (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 131 (P.E.I.S.C.) and
R. v. Morgan (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 502 (N.S. Cty. Ct.), both relatively
uncluttered examples of the operation of the rule.
92. Supra, note 85, and the comments in R. v. Balkan, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 617 at
630; 13 C.C.C. (2d) 482 at 493; 25 C.R.N.S. 109 at 122 (Alta. S.C., A.D.); and
R. v. Doherty (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 at 488 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
93. Brownridge v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 926 at 932; 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 5-6;
7 C.C.C. (2d) 417 at 421; 18 C.R.N.S. 308 at 312.
... unless it is apparent that an accused person is not asserting his right to
counsel bona fide, but is asserting such right for the purpose of delay or for
some other improper reason, the denial of that right affords a "reasonable
excuse" for failing to provide a sample of his breath as required by the section.
It is interesting to note that in Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574 at
581-582; 9 N.S.R. (2d) 145 at 152-3; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 65 at 69-70; 26 C.R.N.S. 207
at 213-4, Ritchie J. adopted the approach of Laskin J. (infra, note 94) to reject the
argument for the appellant. However, a number of courts construed the judgment of
Ritchie J. in Brownridge as being based on "reasonable excuse". See, for
example, R. v. Jones (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 5; 20 C.R.N.S. 58 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
94. Brownridge v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 926 at 950; 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 18;
7 C.C.C. (2d) 417 at 434; 18 C.R.N.S. 308 at 326.
I regard the phrase "without reasonable excuse" as adding a defence or a
bar to successful prosecution which would not be available without these words
. . . it would be strange, indeed, if the effect . . . of the Canadian Bill of Rights
was vitiated by repeal of the words "without reasonable excuse".
95. Id. at 955; 28 D.L.R. at 21-2; 7 C.C.C. at 437; 18 C.R.N.S. at 329.
• . . the failure of the police officer who demanded the breath sample . . . [to
allow right to counsel] vitiated the conviction in this case. . . . because the
violation [of the Bill of Rights] in this case was the very basis upon which the
accused was charged with an offence ...
See the analysis of both judgments of Ritchie and Laskin JJ. by 0 Hearn J. in R. v.
Jones (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 5; 20 C.R.N.S. 58 (N.S. Cty. Ct.), and in R. v.
Doherty (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 at 488 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
96. (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 502 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
It is apparent therefore that in this jurisdiction the position taken by Laskin, J.
• . . is not accepted.
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subsequent case of R. v. Doherty, Macdonald J. A. equally
explicitly adopted the point of view espoused by Laskin J., stating,
on behalf of the Appeal Division:
I am of the opinion that even if the phrase "without reasonable
excuse" did not exist in s. 235(2) of the Criminal Code, that s. 2
(c) (ii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights sets up a defence
independent of such phrase. . . . a denial of this basic
fundamental right affords a valid defence to a charge under s. 235
of the Criminal Code independent of the phrase "without
reasonable excuse" '97
Such a statement commits Macdonald J.A. to hold that, where
the violation of the right to counsel is the basis of the charge against
the accused, the Bill of Rights operates to prevent conviction. What
then would be the result if an accused is asked to provide a breath
sample, is denied access to counsel, and upon refusal is charged
with obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty? 98 Will
the accused be acquitted because denial of counsel is the basis of the
charge, or because the police officer is not in the execution of his
duty?
A note of caution: the timing of a refusal may be determinative of
conviction. In R. v. MacDonald, the accused refused to blow
because he was unable to contact any available lawyer. Macdonald
J.A. found it to be a significant factor against the accused that he
abandoned his efforts to contact counsel before he refused the
demand. 99 On the other hand in R. v. Jumaga, the Manitoba Court
of Appeal upheld a conviction for refusal despite breach of the right
to counsel, because the accused asked for a lawyer after he refused
to blow. The court held by a majority that the offence of refusal was
complete upon actual refusal without involving denial of counsel at
all. '00 It is best, therefore, to ask for counsel and refuse to blow in
that order, and if possible, simultaneously.
Citing R. v. Goldsworthy (1972), (unrep.) S.C. 00095 (N.S.S.C., A.D.). The
Appeal Division, however, construed Laskin J. to mean that because of the Bill of
Rights, the demand was not a "lawful demand". (Id.) That is probably incorrect,
because Laskin J. rejected just such an argument in Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2
S.C.R. 574 at 588; 9 N.S.R. (2d) 145 at 158; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 65 at 75; 26
C.R.N.S. 207 at 218.
97. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 172 at 178; 16 C.C.C. (2d) 494 at 499; 25 C.R.N.S.
289 at 294-5 (S.C., A.D.), citing Laskin J. inBrownridge, [1972] S.C.R. 926; 28
D.L.R. (3d) 1; 7 C.CC. (2d) 417; 18 C.R.N.S. 308.
98. The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34, s. 18.
99. (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 293 at 301-303; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 350 at 357-358 (S.C.,
A.D.).
100. [1974] 5 W.W.R. 580 at 592; 19 C.C.C. (2d) 286 at 298 (Man. C.A.).
766 The Dalhousie Law Journal
(b). Charge of Driving Over 0.08, (s. 236): The Admissibility of
Evidence
Between 1972 and 1974, the question of the admissibility of
evidence obtained in derogation of the right to counsel arose for
decision a number of times, prompted primarily by doubt as to the
theoretical basis of Brownridge and hence as to the extent of its
protection. Courts were almost unanimous in holding that the
breathalyzer reading obtained after a lawful demand was admissible
on a s. 236 charge, despite violation of the Bill of Rights. 10 1
In R. v. Hogan, 102 the Nova Scotia Appeal Division held that the
breathalyzer reading of blood alcohol content was admissible
evidence despite flagrant violation of the right to counsel, 10 3 and
this opinion was subsequently affirmed by a majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada. 10 4 In that case the accused was taken to a
police station in furtherance of a lawful demand and while waiting
there, he heard counsel arrive at the station and requested to see
him. The accused asked to be permitted to consult his lawyer: the
constable refused, and warned the accused that if he did not take the
test, he would be charged with refusal. The accused provided a
breath sample which registered at 0.230 and was charged with
breach of s. 236.105
Ritchie J., for the majority, held that the breathalyzer reading was
relevant, cogent [and fatal] evidence, and was subject to no rule of
exclusion. '0 6 Moreover:
Freedman C.J.M. strongly, and it is submitted correctly, dissented from this view.
101. See, for example, R. v. Jones (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 5; 20 C.R.N.S. 58 (N.S.
Cty. Ct.); R. v. Morgan (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 502 (N.S. Cty. Ct.) (impaired
driving: s. 234); R. v. Top (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 390 (Alta. S.C., T.D.); R. v.
Peterson, [1974] 4 W.W.R. 144; 16 C.C.C. (2d) 531 (Alta. S.C., A.D.); R. v.
Porteous, [1974] 4 W.W.R. 411 (Man. Pro. Ct.). The authority primarily relied
upon was R. v. Steeves, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 266; 42 D.L.R. (2d) 335; 49
M.P.R. 227; 42 C.R. 234 (N.S.S.C. in banco); O'Connor v. The Queen, [1966]
S.C.R. 619; 57 D.L.R. (2d) 123; [1966] 4 C.C.C. 342; 48 C.R. 270. Nor are
proceedings invalidated: R. v. Steeves, id.; O'Connor v. The Queen, id.; R. v.
Jones, id.
102. R. v. Hogan (1972), 5 N.S.R. (2d) 73 (S.C., A.D.).
103. Id. at 76-77, applying O'Connor v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 619; 57
D.L.R. (2d) 123; [1966]4 C.C.C. 342; 48 C.R. 270.
104. Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574; 9 N.S.R. (2d) 145; 18 C.C.C.
(2d) 65; 26 C.R.N.S. 207.
105. The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 236: driving with an alcohol
blood content of more than 0.08.
106. [197512 S.C.R. 574 at 582; 9 N.S.R. (2d) 145 at 153-4; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 65 at
71; 26 C.R.N.S. 207 at 214:
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. . . there is no causal connection between the denial of the right
to counsel and the obtaining of the certificate of the breathalyzer
test . 107 [??]
Laskin J., in dissent, argued that the effect of violation of thie Bill
of Rights in the case at bar was to render the provisions of s. 237,
giving the Crown a special form of proof, inoperative specifically
for the purposes of the particular case. 10 8 His Lordship added that,
if the Bill of Rights was to be taken seriously, a rule of exclusion of
evidence obtained in violation of its provisions should be
adopted. 109
Much can, and will, be said on either side of the essentially
ideological conflict within the Supreme Court revealed by this case.
Suffice it here to note that, when combined with Brownridge, the
majority decision places a premium on police importunity'1 0 and
provides the experienced criminal with an opportunity to avoid
conviction, while offering no succour to the average citizen, who
The result of the breathalyzer test in the present case was not only relevant, it
was in fact of itself the only evidence upon which the appellant could have been
convicted . . . Even if this evidence had been improperly or illegally obtained,
there were therefore no grounds for excluding it at common law.
CitingR. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673; [197014 C.C.C. 1; 11
C.R.N.S. 235.
107. Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574 at 581; 9 N.S.R. (2d) 145 at
152-3; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 65 at 70; 26 C.R.N.S. 207 at 213-4.
108. Id. at 590; 9 N.S.R. at 158-9; 18 C.C.C. at 76; 26 C.R.N.S. at 219-20.
The sanction in the present case would be to preclude use against a person of a
special form of proof when it is obtained following a deliberate violation of a
right of that person under the Canadian Bill of Rights. .. it cannot matter that
resort to s. 237 is the only way in which proof can be made of the main element
of the offence defined in s. 236.
However, id. at 598; 9 N.S.R. at 164; 18 C.C.C. at 82; 26 C.R.N.S. at 225, the
accused could validly have been charged with impaired driving (s. 234).
109. Id. at 593-98; 9 N.S.R. at 160-4; 18 C.C.C. at 78-82; 26 C.R.N.S. at 221-5.
In essence, His Lordship would adopt the American exclusionary rule on policy
grounds, based upon the role of the courts in enforcing the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights in the absence of statutory sanctions.
110. Id. at 589; 9 N.S.R. at 157-8; 17 C.C.C. at 75; 26 C.R.N.S. at 218-9 per
Laskin J.
The question that arises, therefore, is whether the vindication of this right
should depend only on the fortitude or resoluteness of an accused so as to give
rise to a Brownridge situation, or whether there is not also an available sanction
of a ruling of inadmissibility where the police authorities are able to overcome
an accused's resistance . ..
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generally has no knowledge of his legal rights and no legal
provision designed to ensure that he be told. 11'
(c). Some Comments on Whether or Not The Right to Counsel Arises
The right to counsel of Rights is only relevant if an accused has
been "arrested or detained". 112 The question thus arises: when an
accused is subject to a demand under s. 235 and accompanies the
police officer to the station in pursuance of that demand, is that
accused thereby "arrested or detained"? Despite doubt as to the
nature of the arrest concept,"13 it seems clear that s. 235(1) does not
confer a power of arrest," 4 and hence the question becomes: is the
accused thereby "detained"?
In R. v. Jones, 0 Hearn J. expressed doubt on the matter by way
of dictum: but it was not necessary to decide the point and so he did
not do so, merely noting that he was not satisfied that the accused
had been legally detained by operation of the demand. 1 5 He
commented:
111. See comment by the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 148:
• . . there is no affirmative obligation on a police officer to advise a prisoner
that he has a right to communicate with counsel if he wishes to do so.
CitingR. v. De Clercq, [1966] 2 C.C.C. 190 at 192 (Ont. C.A.).
112. The Canadian Bill ofRights, R.S.C. 1970, App. III, s. 2(c)(ii):
. . . no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to...
(c) deprive a person who has been arrested or detained...
(ii) of the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay . . . (emphasis
added).
113. Contrast R. v. Whiffield, [1970] S.C.R. 46; 7 D.L.R. (3d) 97; [1970] 1
C.C.C. 129; 9 C.R.N.S. 59 with the concurring judgment of de Grandpr6 J. in R.
v. Biron (1975), 59 D.L.R. (3d) 409; 4 N.R. 45; 23 C.C.C. (2d) 513; 30 C.R.N.S.
109 (S.C.C.).
114. See, for example, R. v. Poitras (1975), 29 C.R.N.S. 237 (Sask. C.A.)
wherein it was held that an arresting officer must have reasonable and probable
grounds to suspect an offence was being committed against s. 234 before he could
lawfully give a demand under s. 235, and, therefore, that the power to arrest is
limited to arrest under s. 234. See also Brownridge v. The Queen, [19721 S.C.R.
926 at 943-5; 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 13-4; 7 C.C.C. (2d) 417 at 429-30; 18 C.R.N.S.
308 at 320-2, (Pigeon J., dissenting) and [1972] S.C.R. 926 at 945-6; 28 D.L.R.
(3d) I at 15; 7 C.C.C. (2d) 417 at 431; 18 C.R.N.S. 308 at 322-3.
115. R. v. Jones (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 5 at 13; 20 C.R.N.S. 58 at 66 (N.S. Cty.
Ct.).
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In theory of law, the suspect is free to refuse to accompany the
officer and free also to refuse to give the requested sample, and
the law provides an adequate sanction not dependent in any way
on an arrest or detention of the suspect. 116
In R. v. MacDonald, Macdonald J.A. came to a contrary
conclusion, holding that as a matter of common sense, an accused is
stopped by the police, and what happens thereafter is a "direct
result of his being so stopped." Therefore the accused, once
stopped, is detained. 117 In Hogan, Laskin J. was of a similar
opinion"1 8, but Ritchie J., in his only reference to the point, noted:
. . . the initial demand to provide a sample of breath for analysis
was legally made by the constable on the highway in accordance
with s. 235(1) at a time when the accused was neither "arrested"
nor "detained" . . .119
However, he did not apply the logical consequence of this finding to
convict the appellant, but rather regarded the case as damnum sine
injuria. If there was no "detention", then there was no damnum
either, and so for Ritchie J's judgment to have any meaning, it must
be assumed that the accused was "detained" some time later. The
matter is, therefore, still shrouded in mystery.
One further question arises under this head. Is the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights contingent upon a need for counsel
to be present? Pigeon J., dissenting in Brownridge, clearly thought
so:120 but in the present law, the need for counsel's presence is not
I have assumed for the purpose of deciding the matter that the defendant was a
person detained within the meaning of the Canadian Bill of Rights, s. 2, but I
am far from satisfied that that was his position at law.
116. Id. at 11; 20 C.R.N.S. at 64. See also id. at 10-11; 20 C.R.N.S. at 64-5.
While the powers given to the police by the Criminal Code in this instance are
certainly coercive in a psychological sense, the exercise of those powers does
not necessarily result in an arrest or detainer in the legal sense.
117. R. v. MacDonald (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 295 at 298-300; 22 C.C.C. (2d)
350 at 354-356 (S.C.,A.D.).
118. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574 at 587; 9 N.S.R. (2d) 145 at 157; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 65 at
74; 26 C.R.N.S. 207 at 218,per Laskin J.:
There is no doubt . . . that the accused was "detained"...; he risked
prosecution under s. 235(2) if, without reasonable excuse, he refused the
demand which involved accompanying the peace officer to fulfil it.
119. Id. at 581-2; 9 N.S.R. at 153; 18 C.C.C. at 70; 26 C.R.N.S. at 214.
120. [1972] S.C.R. 926 at 943; 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 13; 7 C.C.C. (2d) 417 at 429;
18 C.R.N.S. 308 et 321:
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relevant to a determination of whether or not a right to counsel
exists. 0 Hearn J. has, however, twice drawn attention to the
issue, 121 commenting that the only question on which legal advice
is needed is the question whether the suspect has a "reasonable
excuse" for refusal. 122 One may, however, go further than that.
Absent special unusual circumstances, the only real enquiry can be
as to the "detaining" officer's reasonable and probable grounds for
making the demand, especially since it has been held that the fact
that the accused was not driving or in care or control, or the fact that
the accused was not intoxicated, is not a "reasonable excuse" for
refusal.' 23 A danger exists that "reasonable excuse" and "right to
counsel" may become self defeating, because the only reasonable
excuse that many accused may be able to muster is the lack of
adequate recognition of the right to counsel.
The legal situation of a person who, on request, accompanies a peace officer for
the purpose of having a breath test taken is not different from that of a driver
who is required to allow his brakes to be inspected or to proceed to a weighing
machine . . . Motorists cannot reasonably expect to be allowed to seek legal
advice before complying with such orders.
121. The former case was R. v. Jones (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 5 at 10; 20 C.R.N.S.
58 at 63 (N.S. Cty. Ct.). The point raised by 0 Hearn J. is that Brownridge was
decided before the case of Curr v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 889; 26 D.L.R. (3d)
603; 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181; 18 C.R. N.S. 281, in which the Supreme Court held that
the breathalyzer sections did not violate the self-incrimination provisions of the Bill
of Rights, and hence eliminated one possible ground for discussion between client
and counsel. Hence, His Lordship noted:
• . . that case [Brownridge] could turn out to be the only member of its species
on the basis of this ratio.
Of course, it has not. Moreover, inR. v. MacDonald (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 295 at
298; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 350 at 354 (S.C., A.D.), Macdonald J.A. specifically rejected
this argument.
122. R. v. Doherty (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 at 490 (N.S. Cty. Ct.). It should
also be noted that the question of bona fides is tied up with this point. Clearly,
evidence that counsel and client had nothing to discuss is cogent evidence of an
accused delaying for the sake of delay, and hence evidence ofmalafides which will
lead to conviction despite lack of adequate right to counsel. See, for example,
Brownridge, [1972] S.C.R. 926 at 931, 933; 28 D.L.R. (3d) I at 5, 7; 7 C.C.C.
(2d) 417 at 421,423; 18 C.R.N.S. 308 at 312-3,314-5 (per Ritchie J.).
123. Lack of care and control or driving is not a "reasonable excuse": R. v.
Taraschuk (1973), 12 C.C.C. (2d) 161 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Nicholls, [1974] 1
W.W.R. 97; 14 C.C.C. (2d) 109 (Man. C.A.); R. ex rel. Rayne v. Kirk, [1974] 1
W.W.R. 752 (Sask. D. C.); R. v. Robinson (1974), 27 C.R.N.S. 350 (N.S. Cty.
Ct.); R. v. Nadeau (1974), 8 N.B.R. (2d) 703 (C.A.). Total sobriety is not a
"reasonable excuse": R. v. Lindsay, [1974] 2 W.W.R. 757 (B.C.S.C.); R. v.
Bryden, [1974] 5 W.W.R. 368; 19 C.C.C. (2d) 65 (Alta. S.C., T.D.).
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3. The Right to Counsel and Police Obligations
In R. v. Bond, '24the accused was given a breathalyzer demand at
11.47 p.m., and rang his counsel from the police station at 12.10
a.m. The accused spoke to his lawyer, and advised the police that he
intended to await the arrival of his lawyer, who was driving a
distance of 25-28 miles to reach the police station. The police
refused to wait, and at 12.35 a.m. the accused gave a final
refusal. 125 Cooper J.A., for the Appeal Division, convicted the
accused of refusal, holding that the right to counsel had been
sufficiently recognized by the allowance of a phone call, and that
the police had no obligation to wait. His Lordship applied the
following dicta from the judgment of Laskin J. in Brownridge:
I would not construe the right given by s. 2(c) (ii), when invoked
by an accused upon whom a demand is made under s. 223(1) [s.
235(1)], as entitling him to insist on the personal attendance of
his counsel if he can reach him by telephone. 126
It is submitted that this case should have been decided differently.
Quite apart from the fact that Laskin J. expressed caution against the
application of that paragraph, 127 other courts across Canada have
not taken so strict a view of similar situations. In R. v. Stasiuk,
Dielschneider J. convicted on a similar basis, but only in the
absence of evidence as to the need for personal attendance:128 in R.
v. Anderson, Culliton C.J.S. based his decision on the fact that
neither the lawyer in question nor the accused informed the police
that the lawyer would attend in person. 129 Moreover, in R. v.
124. (1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 512; 14 C.C.C. (2d) 497; 24 C.R.N.S. 273 (S.C.,
A.D.).
125. There were other telephone calls. The accused first called a lawyer who
refused to come to the station, and then called the lawyer who would come. After
that call, the police phoned back and informed counsel that they would not wait
because of the two hour period. The accused and counsel spoke again, and the
accused refused because his lawyer told him to refuse.
126. [1974] S.C.R. 926 at 953; 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 20; 7 C.C.C. (2d) 417 at 436:
18 C.R.N.S. 308 at 328, quoted in Bond (1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 512 at 517-8: 14
C.C.C. (2d) 497 at 501-2; 24 C.R. N.S. 273 at 278 (S.C., A.D.).
127. Brownridge v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 926 at 953; 28 D.L.R. (3d) I at 20:
7 C.C.C. (2d) 417 at 436; 18 C.R.N.S. 308 at 328.
I refrain from enlarging on the matters mentioned in this paragraph of my
reasons because it is better that this be done when particular cases call for it.
128. (1974), 25 C.R.N.S. 309at 315 (Sask. D.C.).
129. (1974), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 301 at 303 (Sask. C.A.).
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Balkan, a majority rejected the Bond point of view completely. '3 O
A more realistic view of the case where an accused wishes to wait
upon the attendance of his lawyer would concentrate primarily upon
the time involved. In Bond, the police could have waited until 1.45
a.m. before the time limit imposed by s. 237 ran out.' 3 ' The law
presently states that an accused has the right to contact a lawyer,
whether or not there is conflict between that right and the
breathalyzer time limit: '3 2 but in the case where an accused, having
contacted counsel, wishes to wait upon the attendance of his lawyer
at the police station, he should be allowed to do so, provided there is
no conflict with the breathalyzer time limit. '3 3
R. v. MacDonald, 134 a recent case before the Nova Scotia Appeal
Division, concerned the quite different problem of an accused who
was given the facilities to contact counsel, but was unable to do so.
Mr. MacDonald attempted, without success, to contact three
lawyers, and then refused the demand. Macdonald J.A. held that the
accused should be convicted because his right to counsel had not
been infringed. '3 5 He held:
I do not feel that in this country the police have any
obligation to contact counsel on behalf of a detained or arrested
person. .136
130. [1973] 6 W.W.R. 617; 13 C.C.C. (2d) 482; 25 C.R.N.S. 109 (Alta. S.C.,
A.D.). The dissenting judgment of McDermid J.A. rests upon a holding similar to
Bond.
131. This may have been the case inR. v. Stasiuk (1974), 25 C.R.N.S. 309 (Sask.
D.C.).
132. This is explicit in the judgment of Laskin J. in Brownridge, [1972] S.C.R.
926 at 954; 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 21; 7 C.C.C. (2d) 417 at 437; 18 C.R.N.S. 308 at
328-9.
... I have no doubt that primacy must be given to the substantive protection
accorded by the Canadian Bill of Rights rather than to the statutory rule of
evidence embodied in s. 224A(c) (ii) [s. 237 (c) (ii)].
133. Hence, inR. v. Balkan, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 617 at 632; 13 C.C.C. (2d) 482 at
495; 25 C.R.N.S. 109 at 124 (Alta. S.C., A.D.), Prowse J.A. commented:
... even if the respondent had had one confidential call to his solicitor I see no
reason why he should not be permitted thereafter to have a confidential
interview, so long as the request for such interview is not made for any ulterior
purpose, such as lack of good faith, or to create any unreasonable delay in the
police investigation.
134. (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 295; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 350 (S.C., A.D.).
135. Following the similar decision in R. v. Drouin (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 18
(P.E.I.S.C.).
136. (1974), 10N.S.R. (2d) 295 at 301; 22C.C.C. (2d) 350at 357 (S.C., A.D.).
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• . . although the right to retain and instruct counsel was not
abridged or infringed, the respondent was unable to exercise the
right. *137
The decision was, no doubt, legally correct: but what of the "spirit
of the law"? Was Mr. MacDonald in a different position from a
man detained who is unable to contact counsel because he cannot
speak English?
4. The Right to Counsel and the Right to Privacy
Development in the right to counsel area after Brownridge has
also concentrated upon the question: if recognition of the right to
retain and instruct counsel without delay is made by granting
permission to an accused to speak to a lawyer, what facilities must
be provided to ensure a full and proper exercise of that right? The
answer of the courts has been to require that the police give an
accused privacy in his consultation with counsel, and if the right to
privacy is not adequately recognized, to acquit of refusal on the
ground of "reasonable excuse" [or its Bill of Rights equivalent].
(a). When Counsel Appears in Person
In the period following the decision in Brownridge, the police
began to recognize a right to contact counsel, but insisted upon the
need to remain close by the accused during consultation, in order to
ensure that the accused did nothing to affect the accuracy of the
breathalyzer machine. 1 3 8 The courts have unanimously regarded the
validity of this argument as entitling the police to keep a visual
surveillance only, and have required that the police give an accused
oral privacy. 139 In R. v. Doherty, Macdonald J.A. discussed the
privacy requirement generally, stating:
137. Id. at 303; 22 C.C.C. (2d) at 358.
138. The interests of the police on this ground are discussed inR. v. Levy (1973),
11 C.C.C. (2d) 521 at 527; 21 C.R.N.S. 292 at 297 (N.S. Pro. Mag. Ct.); R. v.
Balkan, [1973]6 W.W.R. 617 at 620-1, 617-8, 631; 13 C.C.C. (2d) 482 at 485,
491, 494; 25 C.R.N.S. 109 at 113, 119-20, 123 (Alta. S.C., A.D.); R. v. Doherty
(1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 at 489 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
139. The basis for oral privacy is two-fold. First, it is said that communication
between counsel and client must be regarded as confidential and privileged: R. v.
Balkan, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 617 at 631; 13 C.C.C. (2d) 482 at 494; 25 C.R.N.S. 109
at 123 (Alta. S.C., A.D.);R. v. Doherty (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 at 489 (N.S.
Cty. Ct.). Secondly, it is said that without privacy, there could be no proper frank
discussion between client and counsel: R. v. Balkan, id.; R. v. Doherty, id. at 491.
Note also that in R. v. Walkington, [1974] 6 W.W.R. 117; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 553
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• . . a detained person must be allowed to instruct his counsel
outside the hearing of other persons - in other words, under
circumstances that he can confer with and instruct his counsel
without being overheard by anybody. This element of privacy
may well be capable of accomplishment without the detained
person being actually out of sight of those in authority. 14
0
In the subsequent retrial of Mr. Doherty, 141 0 Hearn J. added
two important details to the general principle. First, he held that it is
up to the police to arrange adequate facilities to ensure privacy. 1
42
This holding, it is submitted, is in accordance with Laskin J.'s view
of the primacy of the right to counsel. 143 Second, he held that the
purpose of the right to privacy is to encourage frankness in
communication between counsel and client. Therefore, the
arrangements must permit conversation in a normal tone of voice
without risk of being overheard. 1
44
It cannot be denied that the right to privacy will cause the police
some trouble, particularly with respect to small police facilities
beyond the cities. One may with justice wonder why the law
imposes rigorous conditions on the exercise of the right to counsel,
but makes no provision for the indigent who does not know his
rights, or cannot contact a lawyer at all.
(b). Over the Telephone
The principles discussed above apply equally where an accused
(Sask. C.A.), it was held that because of conflict of interest, the accused has no
right to visual privacy.
140. (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 at 497 (N.S. Cty. Ct.). See generally, on the
right to privacy: R. v. Penner, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 94; 39 D.L.R. (3d) 246; 12
C.C.C. (2d) 468; 22 C.R.N.S. 35 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Balkan, [1973] 6 W.W.R.
617; 13 C.C.C. (2d) 482; 25 C.R.N.S. 109 (Alta. S.C., A.D.).
141. R. v. Doherty (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 (N.S. Cry. Ct.).
142. Id. at 489:
. . . it is for the public authorities and the police to provide adequate
accommodation for this particular purpose.
Id. at 491:
. . the burden of providing adequate accommodation is on the public authority,
not on the defendant.
143. See the quotation from Laskin J.'s judgment in Brownridge contained in note
132, supra.
144. R. v. Doherty (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 at 491 (N.S. Cty. Ct.):
• . . while it may be that the distance was physically adequate for a low-voiced
conversation to be carried on . . . still I think there was a psychological
difficulty here which affected the condition of sufficient privacy.
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exercises his right to counsel by telephone. 145 Little need be added
to these principles except to note the suggestion by 0 Hearn J. that
the installation of a sound proof telephone booth at police stations
would satisfy the privacy requirements of the law. 1
46
(c). Waiver of the Right to Privacy
The Nova Scotia courts have yet to pass upon the question
whether an accused will be deemed to have waived his right to
privacy if he does not request privacy. There is authority suggesting
that lack of request amounts to waiver 14 7 but there is also authority
to the contrary. 148 Neither side of the debate has yet considered the
following dictum from the judgment of Laskin J. in Hogan:
I should note also that there was no contention of waiver by the
accused of his right to counsel, assuming that would be an answer
to an alleged breach of any of his rights as an individual under the
Canadian Bill of Rights. 149
5. Conclusion
The post-Brownridge law on right to counsel has degenerated into
a mass of petty, technical and often contradictory rules. Little
consideration has been given to the reality of the problems with
which s. 2(c) (ii) should deal: problems of access to counsel; of
access to one's rights; and of self-incrimination. The recent case of
R. v. Bagnell' 50 serves as a further warning to police in the area of
145. See, for example, R. v. Penner, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 94; 39 D.L.R. (3d) 246;
12 C.C.C. (2d) 468; 22 C.R.N.S. 35 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Maksimchuk, [1974] 2
W.W.R. 668; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 478; 15 C.C.C. (2d) 208 (Man. C.A.);R. v. Doherty
(1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 172; 16 C.C.C. (2d) 494; 25 C.R.N.S. 289 (S.C., A.D.);R.
v. Stasiuk (1974), 25 C.R.N.S. 309 (Sask. D.C.); R. v. Doherty (1974), 18 C.C.C.
(2d) 487 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
146. R. v. Doherty (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 487 at 491 (N.S. Cy. Ct.).
147. R. v. Stasiuk (1974), 25 C.R.N.S. 309 (Sask. D.C.); R. v. Irwin, [1974] 5
W.W.R. 744; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 563; 28 C.R.N.S. 23 (Man. C.A.).
148. R. v. Maksimchuk, [1974] 2 W. W. R. 668; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 478; 15 C.CC.
(2d) 208 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Balkan, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 617 at 628-9; 13 C.C.C.
(2d) 482 at 492; 25 C.R.N.S. 109 at 120-1 (Alta. S.C., A.D.):
... prejudice must be inferred ... [emphasis added].
149. Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574 at 589; 9 N.S.R. (2d) 145 at 158;
18 C.C.C. (2d) 65 at 76; 26 C.R.N.S. 207 at 219. However, there seems to be no
reason why an accused cannot waive his right to counsel. See R. v. Irwin, [1974] 5
W.W.R. 744 at 748; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 563 at 567; 28 C.R.N.S 23 at 28 (Man. C.A.).
150. (1975), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 351 (S.C., A.D.).
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breathalyzer law. Mr. Bagnell, having been convicted of refusing
the breathalyzer, went after the arresting officer with a loaded
elephant gun. There is a message in that for us all.
IV. Ignorance of the Law as a Defence
1. The MacLean Case and its Result
Nova Scotia courts have dealt, in recent years, with a number of
cases in which an accused has raised mistake or ignorance of law as
a defence to a criminal charge. 151 In general, the courts have been
unresponsive to such a plea, 152 relying upon variations of the
ancient maxim ignorantiajuris non excusatl5 3 and its equivalent in
151. R.v. Ninos, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 326; 48 M.P.R. 383 (N.S.S.C. in banco); R. v.
Pace (1965), 48 D.L.R. (2d) 532; 50 M.P.R. 301; [1965] 3 C.C.C. 55 (N.S.S.C.
in banco); R. v. Jollimore (1962),46 M.P.R. 283; 131 C.C.C. 319 (sub nom. R. ex
rel. Ross v. Jollimore); 36 C.R. 300 (N.S.S.C. in banco); R. v. Villeneuve, [1969]
1 C.C.C. 267; 2 C.R.N.S. 301 (sub nom. R. ex rel. Whittemore v. Villeneuve)
(N.S. Cty. Ct.).
152. See generally G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2d ed. London:
Stevens and Sons, 1961) at 287 ff.; Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (19th ed.
Cambridge: University Press, 1966) at 60-2; Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (2d
ed. London: Butterworths, 1969) at 48-51; C. Howard, Australian Criminal Law
(2d ed. Melbourne: The Law Book Co., 1970) at 370-4; Lafave and Scott,
Handbook on Criminal Law (St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1972) at 362ff.; Model
Penal Code, s. 2.04 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); and the authority referred
to therein. In terms of authority in Canada, see R. v. Brinkley (1907), 14 O.L.R.
434; 12 C.C.C. 454 (C.A.); Kokoliades v. Kennedy (1911), 40 Que. S.C. 306; 13
Que. P.R. 20; 18 C.C.C. 495 (S.C.) [acquitted, but disapproved in R. v Campbell,
infra]; R. v. Shymkowich, [1954] S.C.R. 606; 110 C.C.C. 97; 19 C.R. 401; R. ex
rel. Irwin v. Dalley, [1957] O.W.N. 123; 8 D.L.R. (2d) 179; 118 C.C.C. 116; 25
C.R. 269 (C.A.);R. v. Campbell, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 246; 10 C.C.C. (2d) 26 (Alta.
D.C.). Examples of mistake or ignorance of law providing an excuse via statutory
interpretation are: R. ex rel. Courneyer v. Waters, [1957] O.W.N. 269; 9 D.L.R.
(2d) 649 (C.A.); R. v. Austin (1958), 24 W.W.R. 293; 120 C.C.C. 118; 27 C.R.
355 (B.C.C.A.); R.v. Howson, [1966] 2 O.R. 63; 55 D.L.R. (2d) 582; [1966] 3
C.C.C. 348; 47 C.R. 322 (C.A.); R. v. De Marco (1974), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 369
(Ont. C.A.).
153. See E. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law (1908), 22
H.L.R. 75 at 76 n. 1:
The maxim appears in various wordings. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat:
Lush, J. in Reg. v. Mayor of Tewkesbury, 3 Q.B. 629, 639. Ignorantia eorum,
quae quis scire tenetur, non excusat: 1 Hale P.C. 42. Ignorantia excusatur, non
juris sed facti: 2 Bouvier, Law Dict. 355. Ignorantia juris, quod quisque tenetur
scire, neminem excusat: 4 BI. Com. 27. Ignorantiajuris hand excusat. Cooper v.
Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149, 170.
This may not be the academic esoterjca it seems. See infra, note 172ff.
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the Criminal Code. 154 In R. v. MacLean, 155 however, 0 Hearn J.
was faced with a situation in which:
... the voice of practical sense replies that, in fact, the accepted
'penal" law contains many petty proscriptions of conduct which
are not recognized by normal persons as having moral
significance, and that when social harm becomes so diluted that it
cannot thus be recognized, it is time in the sphere of positive
criminal law to do justice in light of the facts. 1
56
Mr. MacLean was employed at the Halifax International Airport,
and in October 1972 he was convicted of refusal to take a
breathalyzer test 157, a conviction which resulted in the automatic
revocation 158 of his driver's license under provincial legislation. 159
The accused knew that his license had been revoked but, for
employment purposes, he needed to drive at the airport itself. 160 In
doubt as to the matter, the accused telephoned the office of the
Registrar of Motor Vehicles and was told that the revocation of his
driving license was of no consequence with respect to the airport,
because one did not need a license to drive on Government
property. All that was required was the permission of a superior.
Shortly thereafter, while driving with permission, the accused was
154. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 19:
Ignorance of the law by a person who commits an offence is not an excuse for
committing that offence.
In R. v. Shymkowich, [1954] S.C.R. 606 at 624; 110 C.C.C. 94 at 114; 19 C.R.
401 at 418, Locke J. commented:
I do not think the question to be determined is affected by [the then I section 22
of the Criminal Code stating that ignorance of the law is not an excuse for any
offence committed, since the question to be determined is whether or not the
respondent committed any offence.
155. (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84; 27 C.R.N.S. 31 (N.S. Cty.
Ct.).
156. J. Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law (1957), 33 Ind. L.J. 1 at 39.
See alsoMacLean, id. at 582-3; 17 C.C.C. at 102-3; 27 C.R.N.S. at 49-50.
157. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 235(2).
158. The word "revocation" is used advisedly. An interesting recent Nova Scotia
development is to be found in R. v. Fraser (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 698; 18 C.C.C.
(2d) 235 (S.C., A.D.) andR. v. Knickle (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 265; 18 C.C.C. (2d)
341 (S.C., A.D.) in which it was held that a charge of driving while disqualified
contrary to s. 238(3) of the Code by reason of cancellation of license is not
supported by proof of suspension of right to secure a license (Fraser), nor by a
Registrar's certificate stating that an accused's privilege of obtaining a license had
been revoked (Knickle).
159. Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 191, s. 250(2).
160. R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 566; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 86;
27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 33 (N.S. Cty. Ct.). See alsoinfra, note 162.
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involved in a collision at the airport. He was subsequently charged
under s. 238(3) of the Criminal Code with driving a motor vehicle
in Canada while disqualified. At trial, the accused was acquitted,
and the matter came before 0 Hearn J. on appeal by the Crown by
way of trial de novo.
0 Hearn J. began by considering the scope of s. 238(3) (a) and
held that an accused cannot be convicted of an offence against that
section unless the Crown can show that the accused was driving in a
place where he is required by law to have a license to drive, and that
the accused did not have a license because it had been suspended or
cancelled. 161 His Lordship held further that the Nova Scotia Motor
Vehicle Act did not apply to require the accused to have a valid
license at the airport, because the provisions of that Act required
licenses to drive only on a highway, and the accused was driving, at
the time of the collision, in an area not a highway. 162 However, the
Crown produced Federal Airport Vehicle Control Regulations
which stated, inter alia:
No person shall operate a vehicle on an airport unless
(a) he holds all licenses and permits that he is, by the laws of
the province and the municipality in which the airport is
situated, required to hold in order to operate the vehicle in that
province and municipality; .... 163
Prima facie therefore, the accused was required to hold a valid
provincial driving license to drive at the airport; at the time of the
161. Id. at 571; 17 C.C.C. at 91; 27 C.R.N.S at 35, following R. v. Spear Chief
(1963), 45 W.W.R. 161; 42 C.R. 78 (Alta. D.C.); limitingR. v. Munro (1960), 22
D.L.R. (2d) 443; 125 C.C.C. 317; 32 C.R. 9 (Man. C.A.); referring toR. v. Irwin,
[1957] O.W.N. 506 (D.C.).
162. R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 574, 577; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at
94, 97; 27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 41,44 (N.S. Cty. Ct.). As to the spatial limitation of the
Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 191, s. 59(3) and (4), 0 Hearn J. refused to
follow R. v. Denton (1973), 4 N.S.R. (2d) 713 (Pro. Mag. Ct.). His Lordship
noted the generality of the words "in this Province" in s. 59 (3) and s. 59(4) but
limited these words by reference to the more restricted "on the highway[s]" in
other sections. His Lordship further pointed out (id. at 573; 17 C.C.C. at 93; 27
C.R.N.S. at 40) that it would be an absurdity to apply the wider words so as to
require a landowner driving solely on his own land to possess a license. As to
whether or not the driveway in front of the airport was a "highway", His Lordship
referred to the definition contained in s. l(t) of the Act and followed Brinton v.
Sieniewicz (1969), 1 N.S.R. 1965-69 18; 7 D.L.R. (3d) 545 (S.C., T.D.), to hold
that it was not. His Lordship also discussed the power of the Federal Government to
regulate traffic on Federal property (id. at 576-578; 17 C.C.C. at 96-98; 27
C.R.N.S. at 43-45).
163. Cited as Airport Vehicle Control Regulations, S.O.R./64-354.
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collision he did not hold a valid provincial license; hence, absent
any defences, he was guilty of an offence against s. 238(3).
However, 0 Hearn J. went on to hold that the accused's plea that he
believed he did not require a license constituted in the circumstances
a legal excuse for breach of s. 238(3). His Lordhsip held that where
an accused pleads ignorance or mistake of law with respect to
delegated legislation, that plea will constitute an excuse to a crime
charged, if and only if, the accused makes diligent and bona fide
inquiry at an appropriate source with a view to ascertain and abide
by the law, and acts in good faith reliance upon the results of that
inquiry. 16
2. The Nature of the Law: Avoiding s. 19 and the General Maxim
It is important to emphasize, in any consideration of MacLean,
that the accused was not charged with breach of the regulation, the
existence of which was unknown to him. The accused was charged
with violation of s. 238(3) of the Criminal Code, and hence the
rubric of s. 19 applied directly to his case. 16 5 0 Hearn J. refused to
hold that s. 19 afforded a complete answer to the defence of the
accused, stating:
s. 19 is not absolute and cannot be applied without reserve to
every situation where the essential mistake is one of law. 1
66
It is clear from the case law in Canada that s. 19 is qualified,
perhaps via s. 7(3)167, by a number of exceptions. 0 Hearn J.
164. Following Long v. State (Delaware) (1949), 44 Del. 262; 5 Terry 262; 65
A.2d 489. The formulation of the defence is my own.
165. Had the accused been charged with breach of provincial legislation or federal
or provincial regulations, quaere whether s. 19 would have had any application.
See P. Weiler, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Doctrines of Mens Rea
(1971), 49 Can. B. Rev. 280 at 317. Quaere also whether the Summary
Proceedings Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 18, s. 5(l), incorporates s. 19 for the purposes of
provincial offences in applying provisions of the Criminal Code applicable to
summary conviction offences mutatis mutandis to provincial offences.
166. R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 580; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 100;
27 C.R.N.S 31 at 47 (N.S. Cty. Ct.). See also His Lordship's judgment in R. v.
Villeneuve, [1968] 1 C.C.C. 267 at 283; 2 C.R.N.S. 301 at 317 (sub nom. R. ex
rel. Whittemore v. Villeneuve) (N.S. Cty. Ct.) where he analyzes the judgment of
Rand J. inR. v. Shymkowich, [1954] S.C.R. 606; 110 C.C.C. 97; 19 C.R. 401.
167. This subsection continues common law defences, excuses and justifications
to offences in Canada except in so far as they are altered by or are inconsistent with
the Criminal Code or other federal Act. The question of the tension between s. 7(3)
of the Code and other sections codifying previously common law defences is a
question unexplored in Canada. Is. s. 19 qualified by a common law gloss, or is it
exclusive of common law as is s. 17; for example, compulsion? See R. v. Carker,
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referred briefly to cases in which an accused charged with theft was
permitted to rely upon a "claim or colour of right" arising from
mistake or ignorance of law, 168 but that exception clearly had no
application to the case at bar.169 He then referred to two general
principles from Glanville Williams' text, the second of which
formed the starting point from which his excusing principle finally
derived. 170 Glanville Williams stated:
Moreover, the principle of German jurisprudence could be
adopted, that the defendant is required to have exerted his
conscience properly, making enquiry as to the law where a
conscientious person would have done so. 171
[1967] S.C.R. 114; 60 W.W.R. 365; [1967] 2 C.C.C. 190; 2 C.R.N.S. 16; and the
tantalizing comment by 0 Hearn J. in Villeneuve, [1968] 1 C.C.C. 267 at 279; 2
C.R. N.S. 301 at 313 (sub nom. R. ex rel. Whittemore v. Villeneuve) (N.S. Cty.
Ct.).
168. This "exception" to the operation of the s. 19 maxim is to be found in cases
concerning offences containing an explicit requirement that the accused not be
acting under claim or colour of right. See, for example, the Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1970, c. C-34, s. 39(1); s. 42(2) (b); s. 42(3) (a), (b); s. 73(2), (3); s. 250(2); s.
283(1); s. 386; andR. v. Howson, [1966] 2 O.R. 63; 55 D.L.R. (2d) 582; [1966] 3
C.C.C. 348; 47 C.R. 322 (C.A.). There is an extensive discussion by Glanville
Williams, supra, note 152 at 321ff.
169. Some other "exceptions" to s. 19 are indicated by Canadian law.
(a) Where the crime with which the accused is charged requires a "wilful",
"corrupt" or "malicious" intent mistake or ignorance of law will negative that
intent. See R. v. Rees, [1956] S.C.R. 640 at 648-649; 4 D.L.R. (2d) 406 at
412-413; 115 C.C.C. 1 at 8; 24 C.R. 1 at 8-9 (per Rand J. - Locke J.
concurring); R. v. Campbell, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 246 at 250; 10 C.C.C. (2d) 26
at 31 (Alta. D.C.); and commentary by Glanville Williams, supra, note 152 at
317-320 ("Maliciously" and "wilfully") and at 320-321, ("knowingly") and
Howard, supra, note 152 at 370 n. 29. There is considerable American authority
on point, examples of which may be found by reference to Keedy, supra, note
153 at 89 n. 1; R. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law (1939), 88
U. Pa. L.R. 35 at 47-51; P. Ryu and H. Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative
Survey (1957), 24U. Chi. L.R. 421 at 438.
(b) There may be an "exception" where the accused relies upon a law which is
later declared ultra vires: the Canadian example is Kokoliades v. Kennedy
(1911), 40 Que. S.C. 306; 13 Que. P.R. 20; 18 C.C.C. 495, but disapproved in
R. v. Campbell, id.. With their more virulent constitutional jurisprudence, there
is considerable American authority and comment on point: see particularly L.
Hall and S. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea (1944), 8 U. Chi. L.R.
641 at 662ff There is some doubt expressed by Glanville Williams as to the
validity of this exception: supra, note 152 at 302-3.
170. The first principle is to be found in R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d)
564 at 580; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 100; 27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 47 (N.S. Cty. Ct.). 0
Hearn J. does not give a precise reference, but see Glanville Williams, supra, note
152 at 292.
171. Glanville Williams, supra, note 152, quoted in R. v. MacLean (1974), 46
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It should be noted that first, there is no restriction in this statement
of the principle as to the type of law to which it applies, and second,
that enquiry need only be made where a conscientious person would
have done so.
The restriction of the application of this principle to subordinate
legislation was based by 0 Hearn J. upon two separate
considerations: theory and authority. The essence of the argument
on theory rests upon a distinction between use of the word lex and
use of the word jus in the Latin formulation of s. 19.172 If it is
accepted that lex refers to "the positive command of the Prince or
Legislature"'' 7 3 and jus to "the realm of legal right and obligation
generally" 174 then one may also accept, with 0 Heam J., that "lex
becomes part of jus by promulgation and assimilation.' ' 175 Put
another way, an essential difference between lex andjus lies in the
concept of public knowledge of law: and thus public knowledge is a
vital part of the jus referred to by ignorantia juris non excusat. 176 If
the central concept is one of effective promulgation, a distinction
may be drawn between statutes and regulations on the ground that
the former are easier to find and more a part of public, private and
official consciousness than the latter.1 77 Thus both statutes and
D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 581; 17C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 101;27C.R.N.S. 31 at 48 (N.S. Cty.
Ct.).
172. See possible alternative formulations, supra, note 153 and R. v. MacLean
(1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 583-4; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 103-4; 27 C.R.N.S. 31
at 50-I (N.S. Cty. Ct.):
It is true that on occasion the word legis has been substituted forjuris and the
maxim does apply to that kind of law, but only when the lex . . . has entered
into the realm ofjus...
173. R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 583; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 103;
27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 50 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
174. Id. at 584; 17 C.C.C. at 104; 27 C.R.N.S. at51.
175. Id.
176. Id.:
Lex becomes part of jus by promulgation and assimilation . . . the need in
justice to give publicity to an enactment as distinct from the common law,
including other enactments of long standing, if the subject is to be required to
conform himself to it.
177. Id. at 581; 17 C.C.C. at 101; 27 C.R.N.S. at 48:
His ignorance was of the existence of Regulations that, I must confess, are
rather difficult to track down.
See also id. at 578-9, 582; 17 C.C.C. at 98-99, 103; 27 C.R.N.S. at 45-6, 50. That
there is an automatic distinction between regulations and statutes on this basis was
supported by Harrison J. in R. v. Ross, [1945] 3 D.L.R. 574; [1945] 1 W.W.R.
590; 84 C.C.C. 107 (B. C. Cty. Ct.) and the English authority cited infra, note 184
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regulations are lex as soon as valid. The maxim refers to jus:
statutes by nature are deemed to be jus as soon as lex but
regulations, by nature, require effective promulgation to pass from
lex tojus.
This theory does not depend upon considerations of morality and
a distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum
178
although the distinction may be inherent in any distinction drawn
between statute and regulation. Avoidance of the test of subjective
morality is commendable, 179 since much previous fruitless dispute
has centred around the proposition that ignorance or mistake with
respect to a law malum in se is no excuse, but ignorance or mistake
with respect to a law malum prohibitum may excuse. 180 Now
effective promulgation of a regulation is a basis for responsibility
rather than its moral worth. In his focus upon promulgation, 0
Hearn J. could well have cited the following passage by Hall:
Opportunity to examine and study the laws is implied in
democratic theory which would not be satisfied if conflicts were
adjudicated according to laws inaccessible to public inquiry. 181
f., but denied in Comment, Administrative Orders - Publication and Notice to
Defendant - The Regulations Acts of Manitoba and Ontario (1946), 24 Can. B.
Rev. 149 at 150. With respect to other difficulties with the word "juris" see Hall,
supra, note 156 at 40-42.
178. It is surprising that, apart from a chance reference to the point via quotation
from Glanville Williams, supra, note 170, 0 Hearn J. does not mention the
distinction, because much discussion has been concerned with the issue. See, for
example, Hall, supra, note 156 at 35-6, citing Glaser, Ignorantia juris dans le
Droit Penal (1931), Rev. Dr. Penal Et De Crim. Et Arch. Int. Med. Leg. 133; P.
Brett, Mistake of Law as a Criminal Defence (1966), 5 Melb. U.L.R. 179 at 196
ff., citing as an example State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman (1934), 156 So. 705.
See also Ryu and Silving, supra, note 169 at 433 n. 70 and Note, Developments in
the Law: Criminal Conspiracy (1959), 73 H.L.R. 920 at 963 ff.; Re People v.
Powell (1875), 63 N.Y. 88, 13 N.Y.C.A. Rep. 412. However, in Villeneuve,
[1968] 1 C.C.C. 267; 2 C.R.N.S. 301, 0 Hearn J. discussed the distinction at
length, before finally rejecting it at 285; 2 C.R.N.S. at 319.
179. Thus: R. v. Villeneuve, [1968] 1 C.C.C. 267 at 285; 2 C.R.N.S. 301 at 319
(sub nom. R. ex rel. Whittemore v. Villeneuve) (N.S. Cty. Ct.):
Moral duties should not be identified with criminal duties.
G. Hughes, Criminal Responsibility (1964), 16 Stan. L.R. 470 at 481: See also
Brett, id. Problems of particular difficulty arise where an accused commits a
collateral mistake. For example, consider the case of the man who kills X because
he thinks X is trespassing and that he had a legal right to kill a trespasser. Assuming
that the accused has a legal right to kill a trespasser, what result if the errorjuris is
as to whether X is trespassing? Murder is malum in se, but the mistake is malum
prohibitum. See Weston v. Commonwealth (1885), 111 Pa. 251,2 A. 191.
180. Id. See also infra, note 200.
181. Hall, supra, note 156 at 35 n. 143. This part of Hall's general discussion of
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Turning now to considerations of authority, it should be noted
that the principal authority, from which most of the defence
formulated by 0 Hearn J. is derived, Long v. State, 182 was not a
case concerned with vague and obscure regulations or orders, but
with the crime of bigamy, and the principle enunciated in that case
was not qualified by the type of law to which it applied.
183
Concentration upon the notion of promulgation, however, led
O Hearn J. to a series of English cases concerned with ignorance or
mistake with respect to regulations. Foremost among them was the
case of Johnson v. Sargant & Sons, 184 a civil action relating to the
cancellation of a contract for the sale of beans allegedly by an
administrative Order dated on the exact day of performance, but
only made public by newspaper announcement on the following
day. The plaintiff could succeed only if the Order was operative qua
the contract on the date of performance. Bailhache J. gave judgment
for the defendants, holding that while statutes became effective at
time of enactment, Orders required notice or promulgation before
they became effective. 185
This judgment anticipated, or perhaps prompted, the enactment
in England of a provision creating a statutory defence of ignorance
the "principle of legality", which is based not on a need to find knowledge of the
law on which to found responsibility, but upon the ethics of a determination of
responsibility absent such knowledge (id. at 21). Hence Hall would agree that
promulgation should be a (partial?) determinant of culpability, but would not be
prepared to agree that it is (id. at 40).
182. Supra, note 164.
183. The crime of bigamy has raised special problems in the area of mistake of law
and fact. See Glanville Williams, supra, note 152 at 333ff.; G. Paton,Bigamy and
Mens Rea (1939), 17 Can. B. Rev. 94; R. v. Thompson (1905), 70 J.P. 6 (C.C.C.);
R. v. Sellars (1905), 9 C.C.C. 153 (N.S. Cty. Ct.); R. v. Brinkley (1907), 14
O.L.R. 434; 12 C.C.C. 454 (C.A.); R. v. Bleiler (1912), 4 A.L.R. 320; 1 D.L.R.
878; 19 C.C.C. 249 (Alta. S.C. in banco); R. v. Connatty (1919), 83 J.P. 292
(C.C.C.); R. v. Wheat, [1921] 2 K.B. 119; 15 Cr. App. R. 134; R. v.
Carswell, [1926]N.Z.L.R. 185 (C.A.); Thomas v. The King (1937-38), 59 C.L.R.
279; R. v. Morgan (1942), 78 C.C.C. 129 (N.S.C.A.); Williams v. North Carolina
(1944), 325 U.S. 226; State v. De Meo (1955), 20 N. 3d 1; 118 A.2d 1
(N.J.S.C.); People v. Vogel (1956), 46 C.2d 798; 299 P.2d 850 (Calif. S.C.).
O Hearn J. recognized, of course, that Long had no immediate application to
MacLean(1974),46D.L.R. (3d)564at586; 17C.C.C. (2d)84at 106;27C.R.N.S. 31
at 53 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
184. (1918] 1 K.B. 101 (D.C.); cited inMacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at
583; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 103; 27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 50 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
185. Id. at 583; 17 C.C.C. at 103; 27 C.R.N.S. at 50. The case and others which
followed, have been the subject of some comment. See, for example, Glanville
Williams, supra, note 152 at 295-6; C. Allen, Statutory Instruments Today (1955),
71 L.Q.R. 490 at 501-4.
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of a statutory instrument if that instrument had not been issued by
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, unless reasonable steps had been
taken to bring the instrument to the notice of parties affected by
it.1 86 However, the common law principle in Johnson v. Sargant &
Sons was followed in Canada in R. v. Ross 187 in which an accused
was charged with unlawfully entering a closed district for the
purpose of hunting without a permit, contrary to an order made by a
Minister under statute.1 88 Harrison J. noted that the order in
question had not been publicized,189 and acquitted the accused,
applying the principle contained in Johnson v. Sargant & Sons. 190
Two general points arise from these cases which are of
importance to the MacLean defence. First, it is evident that in
referring to the notion of "promulgation", it is not intended to refer
to the technical procedure whereby a proposal becomes validly
enacted law (lex). Rather, "promulgation" refers to the process of
public notice or assimilation whereby the valid law moves from the
realm of lex to the realm of jus. 191 Secondly, one must distinguish
"direct" mistake or ignorance of law from "indirect" or
"collateral" mistake or ignorance of law. 192 Generally, the mistake
or ignorance is "direct" if the accused is charged with a breach of
the law concerning which he was mistaken, or of the existence of
which he was ignorant. The mistake or ignorance is "collateral" if
186. The Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (1946), 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 36, s. 3(2).
See also the Ontario Regulations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 410, ss. 2-5; the Nova
Scotia Regulations Act, S.N.S. 1973, c. 15, ss. 3-6, (unproclaimed). The Federal
Statutory Instruments Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 38, s. 11(2) was applicable in
MacLean, but of no assistance because the regulations were published in the
Gazette.
187. Supra, note 177.
188. ForestAct, R.S.B.C. 1936, c. 102, s. 119(1).
189. R. v. Ross, [1945] 3 D.L.R. 574 at 576; [1945] 1 W.W.R. 590 at 592; 84
C.C.C. 107 at 109 (B.C. Cty. Ct.):
There was no evidence adduced of promulgation of the said order, or to indicate
any circumstances from which it might be inferred that it was probable or likely
that the appellant or any of his companions would or could have had notice of
such order, prior to their said meeting with the forest and game officials.
190. Id. at 577; [1945] 1 W.W.R. at 593; 84 C.C.C. at 110:
I think this view of the matter, without the necessity of further enlargement, is
fairly in accord with the decisions rendered, respectively, in Johnson v. Sargant
& Sons, ... and Brightman & Co. v. Tate .
191. Thus, for example, in Ross, id. at 576; [194511 W.W.R. at 592; 84 C.C.C.
at 109, Harrison J. speaks of a lack of "promulgation" although there was no
doubt that the Order in question was valid (lex). See Allen, supra, note 186.
192. See generally Hall,supra, note 156at 20; Brett, supra, note 178 at 186.
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the accused knows the law with which he is charged, but
responsibility on the basis of that law is contingent upon mistake or
ignorance qua another law altogether. Mr. Ross was guilty of direct
ignorance; Mr. MacLean was guilty of collateral mistake, because
he knew it to be illegal to drive without a license, but he did not
know of the existence of the law requiring him to possess a
license. 193
Notwithstanding contrary authority, 194 the Privy Council has
shown a willingness to accept a defence similar to or the same as
that in MacLean. In Lim Chin Aik v. The Queen, 195 Lord Evershed
stated:
It was said. . . that the order, once made, became part of the law
of Singapore of which ignorance could provide no excuse . . . In
their Lordship's opinion, even if the making of the order by the
Minister be regarded as an exercise of the legislative as distinct
from the executive or administrative function (as they do not
concede), the maxim cannot apply to such a case as the present
where it appears that there is . . . no provision, corresponding,
for example, to that contained in s. 3(2) of the English Statutory
Instruments Act, 1946 . . . or any other provision designed to
enable a man by appropriate inquiry to find out what "the law"
is. 19
6
193. Hence the relevance of Johnson v. Sargant, [1918] 1 K.B. 101 (D.C.),
despite the fact that the case concerned an action in contract. The result should not
have been different in that case had the plaintiff been charged with disobedience of
the requisitioning Order. Mistake of civil law may thus be a very relevant
consideration. See, for example, supra, notes 179 and 183.
194. Of course, the cases are many in which the court has simply applied a
common law or statutory equivalent of the errorjuris maxim. Illustrative are the
two cases considered in detail by Brett, supra, note 178 both of which concerned
regulations: Crichton v. Victorian Dairies Ltd., [1965] V.R. 49 (Vict. S.C., Full
Ct.); Surrey County Council v. Battersby, [1965] 2 Q.B. 194; [1965] 2 W.L.R.
378; [1965] 1 All E.R. 273 (Q.B.D.). In the United States, see Chaplin v. State
(1879), 7 Tex. App. 87 (ignorance of law no defence re an executive
proclamation); State v. Williams (1892), 36 S.C. 493; 15 S.E. 554 (ignorance of
law no defence re municipal legislation). See also R. v. Slegg and Slegg Forest
Products Ltd. (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 149 at 157 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) in which the
court held:
It is no defence that the defendant used diligence to obtain legal advice and
acted upon it...
195. [1963] A.C. 160; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 42; [1963] 1 All E.R. 223 (P.C.)
(Singapore).
196. Id. at 171; [1963] 2 W.L.R. at47; [1963] 1 All E.R. at 226-7. The quotation
is dicta, the main question before their Lordships being whether or not proof of
mens rea was required for conviction under the Ordinance. However, it is worth
noting that:
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It may perhaps be implied from this judgment that the existence or
otherwise of a statutory provision relating to promulgation would be
determinative of the existence of a defence of the kind outlined.
However, it is suggested that with a multiplicity of delegated
legislation such a position would be unwise, particularly since the
provision and the defence only partially overlap. As in MacLean, an
accused may still be misled: and the defence may have limited
operation beyond the terms of a provision the same or similar in
terms to the English enactment. 1
97
3. The Relevance of Mens Rea
Mistake or ignorance of law, when considered as a possible
defence to a criminal charge, is generally relied upon to negative the
mens rea required by the particular offence charged. 198 Thus, there
is ample authority to suggest that mistake of law constituting a claim
of colour of right, or as a defence to charges involving wilful,
corrupt, or malicious behaviour, is a defence because the mistake
(a) Their Lordships appear to be prepared to distinguish between legislative and
non-legislative acts as was done in Ross and MacLean.
(b) Their Lordships use the word "appropriate" to qualify the word "inquiry".
The same word is used by 0 Hearn J. in R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d)
564 at 587; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 107; 27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 55 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
See infra, note 207.
(c) As to the reference to the English Statutory Instruments Act, see supra, note
186.
197. An interesting sidelight to MacLean is the reference by 0 Hearn J. in that
case (R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 582; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 102;
27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 49) to the concept of "due process" as it affects this question. In
Lambert v. California (1957), 355 U.S. 225, a majority of the American Supreme
Court struck down an obscure Los Angeles municipal ordinance requiring a
convicted felon resident in Los Angeles for more than five days to register with the
police, as violative of due process. The basis of the decision was apparently that to
convict on the basis of passive conduct without adequate notice to an accused that
such passive conduct violates a legal duty is contrary to due process. See G.
Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea (1958), 42 Minn. L.R. 1043; U.S. v. Juzwiak
(1958), 258 F.2d 844 (Second Circuit); Reyes v. U.S. (1958), 258 F.2d 774 (Ninth
Circuit).
198. See, for example, Brett, supra, note 178 at 191, citing as examples R. v.
Crespigny (1795), 1 Esp. 280; 170 E.R. 357;R. v. Allday (1837), 8 C. & P. 136;
173 E.R. 431; R. v. Dodsworth (1837), 8 C. & P. 218; 173 E.R. 467. Most
authority treats the point as axiomatic, but a clear example isR. v. Bohman (1975),
20 C.C.C. (2d) 117 at 125 (Ont. D.C.), in which a plea of mistake of law leading to
lack of mens rea was rejected because the accused deliberately attracted
prosecution to produce a test case, and hence had pre-existing mens rea.
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negatives a particular mens rea required to constitute the crime.1 99
This basis is accommodated in the theory founded upon the malum
in se - malum prohibitum distinction under the theory that:
. . . the knowledge that the relevant conduct is legally forbidden
is an essential element of its immorality. 2
0 0
Long v. State20 1 was predicated upon a finding by the court in
that case that ignorance or mistake of law will not only negative the
"specific intent" required by larceny or "wilful" offences, but will
also negative a "general intent" or "mens rea as we commonly
understand it" .202 While in the former case, the lack of "specific
intent" will lead to acquittal, in the latter, considerations of policy
dictate a conviction notwithstanding lack of mens rea. 20 3 The court
then held that where the accused makes a bona fide and diligent
effort to ascertain and abide by the law, and acts in accordance with
his enquiries, the policy considerations underlying ignorantia juris
are statisfied and the accused should be acquitted because of lack of
mens rea. 
2 0 4
In MacLean, 0 Hearn J. pointed out that the offence with which
the accused was charged (s. 238(3)) was an offence requiring mens
rea, 20 5 and therefore His Lordship could follow the Long reasoning
consistently. But would the result have been different had the
199. These defences are detailed, supra, note 169.
200. Hall, supra, note 156 at 35. See also Keedy, supra, note 153 at 90-1. Brett,
supra, note 178 at 196 n. 65, regards the two positions as incompatible.
201. Supra, note 164.
202. R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 584; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 104;
27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 51 (N.S. Cty. Ct.) citing Long v. State (Delaware) (1949), 65
A.2d 489 at 497.
203. Long v. State (Delaware) (1949), 65 A.2d 489 at 497:
Thus, mistake of law is disallowed as a defence in spite of the fact that it may
show an absence of the criminal mind. The reasons for disallowing it are
practical considerations dictated by deterrent effects upon the administration
and enforcement of the criminal law...
Citing Perkins, supra, note 169 at 41.
204. Long v. State (Delaware) (1949), 65 A.2d 489 at 498:
Any deterrent effects upon the administration of the criminal law which might
result from allowing a mistake of [that] classification as a defence seem greatly
outweighed by considerations which favor allowing it.
205. R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 579; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 99;
27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 46 (N.S. Cty. Ct.) citing R. v. Jollimore (1962), (46 M.P.R.
283; 131 C.C.C. 319 (sub nom. R. ex rel. Ross v. Jollimore); 36 C.R. 300
(N.S.S.C. in banco); R. v. Finn, [1972] 3 O.R. 509; 8 C.C.C. (2d) 233 (C.A.); R.
v. Roliff, [1973] 11 C.C.C. (2d) 10 (Ont. C.A.);R. v. Ooms (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d)
69 (Sask. C.A.).
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accused been charged with violation of the regulation of which he
was ignorant? Presumably the court would have been forced to
determine whether the regulation created a strict liability offence.
Two comments arise from this discussion. First, is the MacLean
defence restricted to crimes requiring mens rea? If so, it will have
very limited scope in cases of direct mistake or ignorance of
regulations, since many regulations must be regarded as imposing
strict liability particularly when regard is had to the Supreme Court
of Canada's criterion for such offences, which rests in part upon
whether or not the offence is serious and carries a criminal character
or stigma. 20 6 Secondly, in cases of collateral mistake or ignorance,
it would presumably be open to the Crown to prosecute for violation
of the regulation directly rather than pursue the collateral crime in
some cases, and hence avoid the MacLean defence.
4. The Source of Reliance
The excusing principle formulated from MacLean requires an
accused to inquire at an "appropriate" source. 0 Hearn J. shed
little light upon the meaning of this criterion, commenting:
• . . while there were other sources of information open to him,
he went to the source that people ordinarily use to secure
information about drivers' licenses and the requirements of
licensing and in that sense the source was appropriate. In an
objective sense it was not appropriate of course, but subjective
ignorance of that fact is merely part of the communal ignorance
of the law and things legal.
20 7
This passage presents difficulty. On the one hand it is said that
the source was "appropriate" because people would ordinarily use
it, thus implying a degree of objectivity, but on the other hand it is
said that the source in this case was not objectively "appropriate".
The resolution of this apparent ambiguity is of no little importance
206. See, for example, R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 5 at 17; 12
D.L.R. (3d) 591 at 600; 12 C.R.N.S. 272 at 281; [1970] 5 C.C.C. 193 at 201,per
Ritchie J., who in holding that the regulations did not require mens rea noted:
I do not think that a new crime was added to our criminal law by making
regulations [of this kind] . . . nor do I think that the stigma of having been
convicted of a criminal offence would attach to a person found to have been in
breach of these regulations.
The exception derives principally from Sherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] 1 Q.B. 918
(Q.B.D.).
207. R. v. MacLean (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564 at 587; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 at 107;
27 C.R.N.S. 31 at 54 (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
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for the difference is between imposing responsibility for reckless-
ness (subjectively "appropriate") or for negligence (objectively
"appropriate"). If the defence applies only to crimes requiring
mens rea, it is submitted that the former is the more consistent
course to adopt.
The concept of "appropriate" will mean that the character of the
source will depend largely upon the type of law involved in the
case. 0 Hearn J. has said that one may rely upon the advice of a
government official, but does that official have to be of a certain
status? What would have been the result had Mr. MacLean received
the same advice from his lawyer? Hall has argued that one may not
plead as a defence advice by counsel, for to allow such a defence
would render such advice paramount to law. 20 8 However, it is said,
one may rely upon an official responsible for the administration of
an area of law, within that area, since by power of discretion and
interpretation, the official may be said to have quasi-legislative
power.20 9 Yet in Long v. State, the advice upon which the accused
relied was that of his lawyer.210 One looks forward to further
judicial utterance.
5. The Quality of Ignorance and Mistake
The fact that the accused must make inquiry will mean that the
successful plea based on MacLean will be more correctly described
as "mistake" than "ignorance". In terms of a concept of
responsibility based primarily on mens rea, this is surely as it should
be: for should not the person who makes an effort to discover his
208. Hall, supra, note 156 at 23-4. See also the discussion by Perkins, supra, note
169 at 42-3; Hall and Seligman, supra, note 169 at 652-3. Specific case examples
in the U.S. have used this rationale: People v. McCalla (1923), 63 Cal. App. 783;
22 P. 436 at 441;Needham v. State (1934), 32 P.2d 92 at 93 (Oklahoma). See also
Crichton v. Victorian Dairies, [1965] V.R. 49 (Vict. S.C., Full Ct.).
209. Hall, id. at 24 and 26. Strong dicta contra are contained in Howell v.
Falmouth Boat Const. Co., [1951] A.C. 837 at 845, 849; [1951] 2 All E.R. 278 at
280-1, 284-5; [1951] 2 T.L.R. 151 at 155-6, 158 (H.L.). But see supporting
authority discussed at length by Hall and Seligman, id. at 167-683, and the
illustrative cases of: R. v. Dodsworth (1837), 8 C. & P. 218; 173 E.R. 467; State v.
Freeland (1927), 318 Mo. 560; 300 S.W. 675; People v. Ferguson (1933), 134
Cal. App. 41; 24 P.2d 965;People v. Settles (1938), 29 C.A. 2d 781; 78 P. 2d 274.
Quaere whether one may rely upon judicial decision: the matter is discussed by the
commentators cited supra, but in R. v. Campbell, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 246; 10
C.C.C. (2d) 26 (Alta. D.C.) the reliance upon judicial decision overturned by
subsequent appeal was no excuse.
210. Long v. State (Delaware) (1949), 65 A.2d 489.
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legal duty be in a better position than he who is ignorant because of
voluntary indifference? 2 1 ' To reflect such a difference in sentence
alone is an inadequate response,212 particularly where an accused
measures up to the standard of "diligent and bona fide" inquiry.
The meaning of "diligent" will, no doubt, vary from case to case,
and will therefore be subject to judicial interpretation: but when read
with "bona'fide", it must be held to impart a less than strictly
objective standard.
6. Conclusion
The utility and commonsense of the presumption that every
citizen knows the law has long been doubted.2 13 With the modern
proliferation of administrative control over every facet of everyday
life, it has long since been divorced from reality, and a recognition
of this fact by the law has long been overdue. The spirit of R. v.
MacLean may live to force both government and civil service to
organize and make known a path through the maze of an ever
increasing amount of subordinate legislation.
211. To a degree, Hall, supra, note 156 at 38-9 disagrees, but his position is
principally in accord with that in the text. As to the distinction between ignorance
and mistake, see: Howard, supra, note 152 at 367-370; Hall, id.; Brett, supra, note
178 at 185-6.
212. Brett,supra, note 178 at 201:
• . . the circumstances should entitle the defendant to full exoneration as a
matter of right, rather than to something less as a matter of grace.
213. The classic statement on point is that attributed to Maule J. in Martindale v.
Falkner (1846), 2 C.B. 706 at 719; 135 E.R. 1124 at 1129:
There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law; it
would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so.
